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BANKING AND THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONALISM 
 
 
DIMITY KINGSFORD SMITH,* THOMAS CLARKE** AND JUSTINE ROGERS*** 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Few other occupations that aspire to professional status have the influence, 
both beneficial and destructive, or the raw power to resist regulation and political 
constraint, that banking has. The global financial crisis (‘GFC’) and revelations 
of bank manipulation of the benchmark London Inter-bank Offering Rate 
(‘LIBOR’),1 which followed quickly afterwards, showed devastatingly the worst 
of this influence and power. These failings have been diagnosed as stemming 
from a foundational collapse in the values of individuals and in the governance of 
banking entities.2 The critique has concentrated on demands for better decisions 
and conduct from individuals, as well as changes in the entities for which they 
work, to better support those individuals. This post-GFC prescription for banking 
has turned attention to the professions as a possible framework for promoting 
individual ethical conduct in banking.3 Indeed, since the LIBOR revelations, even 
banking itself has expressed a desire to professionalise.4 
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1  See Intercontinental Exchange, ICE LIBOR (2017) <https://www.theice.com/iba/libor>. 
2  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Market and Morals: A New Citizenship’, The Reith Lectures: 2009, 9 
June 2009 (Michael Sandel) <www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00kt7sh>; Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘Corporate 
Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ [2009] (1) OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 61; 
John R Boatright, ‘Swearing to Be Virtuous: The Prospects of a Banker’s Oath’ (2013) 71 Review of 
Social Economy 140; Bert van de Ven, ‘Banking after the Crisis: An Understanding of Banking as a 
Professional Practice’ (2011) 18 Ethical Perspectives 541. 
3  van de Ven, above n 2. 
4  ‘The new leaders of the largest banks have been vocal in disowning the previous regime, admitting 
mistakes and pledging a new approach’: see Joint Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 
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There were several factors involved in the GFC financial collapse: low 
interest rates globally, a housing bubble in the US fuelled by US banks’ 
securitisation practices,5 mis-selling which spread highly risky financial interests 
to financial institutions across the globe,6 failures by regulators7 and an overall 
preference for the profits of the banks conducting these transactions in disregard 
of the interests of other stakeholders involved. 8  The LIBOR manipulations 
targeted a leading benchmark of the international financial infrastructure, against 
which national and international interest rates are set worldwide. The rates 
thereby set may influence the cost of capital and rates of economic growth.9 We 
are therefore discussing entities and individuals whose decisions and conduct 
have profound economic, social and political consequences. 
Our primary question is whether banking could become a profession. We 
start challenged by the insight of our co-author Thomas Clarke that the business 
terrain of finance is the most hazardous on which to establish the practices of a 
profession. Likewise, evidence to the 2013 United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
Parliamentary Commission into Banking Conduct suggested that banking may 
once have been considered a profession,10 but that it is no longer considered one, 
and has certainly not been a profession since the 1980s. It also indicated that 
banking, if it ever were a profession, is not an occupation ready for ‘re-
professionalisation’.11 So, we start from the position that whether banking is, or 
might become, a profession is not obvious, for a number of reasons. The first is 
the intense government regulation which is generally the primary mode of 
securing the benefits of banking and limiting its undesirable effects. External 
regulation tends to be regarded as a definitional and practical threat to the self-
regulation that marks out traditional professionalism. Second, traditional 
                                                                                                                         
II, House of Lords Paper No 27-II, House of Commons Paper No 175-II, Session 2013–14 (2013) 
(‘Changing Banking for Good vol II’) 166. 
5  John B Taylor, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went 
Wrong’ (Working Paper No 14631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Stanford University, January 
2009) 2, 5–7; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States’ 
(2011) 42–5, 127–9 (‘Financial Crisis Inquiry Report’); Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold: How Unrestrained 
Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global Markets and Unleashed a Catastrophe (Little, Brown, 
2009) 48–65 and generally. 
6  See generally Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy (W 
W Norton & Company, 2010); Tett, above n 5, 66–82. 
7  Raghuram G Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy (Princeton 
University Press, 2010) 101–14, 148–52; Charles A E Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the 
Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 2009) 56. See generally Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to 
Blame? (Polity, 2010). 
8  Tett, above n 5, 287–9, 298–301; British Broadcasting Corporation, above n 2; van de Ven, above n 2 
541–51. 
9  David Hou and David Skeie, ‘LIBOR: Origins, Economics, Crisis, Scandal and Reform’ (Staff Reports 
No 667, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, March 2014) 7–9, 12. The LIBOR has come to public 
attention recently because, in 2012, it was discovered that a number of global banks were wrongfully 
collaborating to manipulate the LIBOR for their own financial advantage. 
10  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 295–6, quoting Evidence to Joint Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards, United Kingdom, 14 January 2014, Q 2403, Ev 926 (Simon 
Thompson, Chief Executive of the Chartered Banker Institute). See also van de Ven, above n 2. 
11  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 391. 
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professional logic is said to promote as one of its distinguishing features a 
contrast with, and at least to some extent a corrective to the world of business, a 
world ‘dominated by large bureaucratic organizations, competitive markets, 
managerial control, deskilling or dehumanizing tendencies and a markedly for-
profit logic’.12 Meanwhile, some bankers, including those who advocate change, 
perceive profit-making as integral to banking. Evidence to the Inquiry included 
the view of a senior banker that: ‘Banking is a strictly profit-making business, 
and is not, and never has been, a profession in the sense that, say, medicine or 
law is’.13 
Third, directly at odds with the last opinion and perhaps most challenging of 
all, is whether banking could ever act in the public interest, the leading feature of 
established professions if not always enacted. Behind the demands for greater 
professionalism lies an unspoken assumption that somehow ‘professionalising’ 
will increase banks’ loyalty to the public interest in preserving and advancing 
important financial institutions,14 the way medicine does for public health and 
law for the legal system. There is also the assumption that it will improve the 
motivations, attitudes, cultures and conduct relating to the treatment of clients or 
consumers and likewise to other traditional professional beneficiaries, including 
colleagues and the occupation itself. Our discussion of these latter challenges 
comprises the core of this article. We also consider the underlying assumption 
that having an altruistic or public-regarding purpose actually does inspire higher 
standards of individual conduct. Having reviewed the slim and difficult evidence 
on this question, this article adopts a transparently normative outlook to its 
question. We argue that the most powerful occupations should serve a paramount 
duty to the public interest in important social and economic institutions. 
Demands for professionalism, such as we make here, are important, as Breakey 
argues, for ‘the construction, reform or continuance of a professional ethos’ and 
as a spur to ‘the ethical materiel out of which [professional] norms emerge’.15 We 
are examining whether, in banking, the basic structures, processes and beliefs are 
present to support a public interest, which might be formulated provisionally as a 
duty to foster a ‘resilient, fair and efficient financial system’,16  and likewise 
support client and community trust in banking. In short, does banking have what 
it takes to professionalise, so that it might fare better than has been the case under 
                                                 
12  Daniel Muzio and John Flood, ‘Entrepreneurship, Managerialism and Professionalism in Action: The 
Case of the Legal Profession in England and Wales’ in Markus Reihlen and Andreas Werr (eds), 
Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurship in Professional Services (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 
369. 
13  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 295, quoting Evidence to Joint Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards, United Kingdom, 28 July 2012, Ev 1168 (Neil Jeffares, former senior City of 
London banker). 
14  van de Ven, above n 2. 
15  Hugh Breakey, ‘Supply and Demand in the Development of Professional Ethics’ in Marco Grix and Tim 
Dare (eds), Contemporary Issues in Applied and Professional Ethics (Research in Ethical Issues in 
Organizations vol 15, Emerald Group Publishing, 2016) 1. 
16  The Financial System Inquiry Committee, ‘Financial System Inquiry Final Report’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia, November 2014) (‘Murray Report’) argued at xv that the basic characteristics or principles of a 
financial system to be properly functioning are that it should be ‘efficient’ ‘resilient’, ‘and ‘fair’.  
414 UNSW Law Journal Volume 40(1) 
regulation of legislative origin or the ‘chaos and self-interest of the market’?17 It 
is not enough to say that higher service delivery levels to clients or absence of 
misleading practices amounts to professionalism. These are welcome, but they 
are far from the sum total of being a professional or acting as a profession. 
To engage in this discussion about whether banking has features that make it 
amenable to professionalising introduces one of the familiar debates in the 
sociological literature: whether there are traits and standards of professionalism 
adequately stable and empirically grounded to legitimately assess their qualities. 
Traditional professions have tended to describe groups of individuals pursuing 
worthwhile economic activities, driven and integrated by practices and values of 
autonomy and moral obligation. Bolstering the social order that these  
practices are said to advance have been the professional associations and their 
sets of professional ethics.18 This interpretation has been supplemented by an 
understanding of the special social status of professions as a consequence of their 
guardianship of ‘superior “technical competence”’.19 These occupational qualities 
mean that their organisation is rightfully and, indeed needs to be, an alternative to 
market relations and government – and now workplace – bureaucracy.20 
As detailed in an earlier article in this Issue,21 however, and some of many 
difficulties in this discussion, the meanings of professionalism, which regularly 
come from professions themselves, are often contradictory.22 They are replete 
with ‘stereotypes, rhetorical claims and deceptive appearances’.23 The established 
professions’ conceptions and practices of public service can mean, in effect, 
supporting their own economic and status projects24 and the conservation of their 
institutions. As a final example here, professionalism is not a static social 
construct; its meanings change over time. Professions themselves have created, 
been beset by, and had to adapt to huge social changes and challenges. In the 
process, the contours and standards of professionalism have changed such that 
they entail values, discourses and practices closer to commercialism and 
managerialism. 25  Most professionals still work in small partnerships, as sole 
practitioners or in government institutions, grounded in particular regions or 
                                                 
17  Christine Parker and Tanina Rostain, ‘Law Firms, Global Capital and the Sociological 
Imagination’ (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2347, 2356. 
18  Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Cornelia Brookfield trans, Free Press, 1958) 7–8 
[trans of: ‘Leçons de sociologie: Physique des mœurs et du droit, first published 1950]. 
19  Talcott Parsons, ‘The Professions and Social Structure’ (1939) 17 Social Forces 457, 460.  
20  Parker and Rostain, above n 17. 
21  Justine Rogers, Dimity Kingsford Smith and John Chellew, ‘The Large Professional Service Firm: A 
New Force in the Regulative Bargain’ (2017) 40 University of New South Wales Law Journal 218. 
22  Justine Rogers, ‘Representing the Bar: How the Barristers’ Profession Sells Itself to Prospective 
Members’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 202; David Sugarman and W Wesley Pue (eds), Lawyers and 
Vampires: Cultural Histories of Legal Professions (Hart Publishing, 2003). 
23  Muzio and Flood, above n 12, 369. 
24  Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of California 
Press, 1979) xvii. 
25  See Rogers, Kingsford Smith and Chellew, above n 21. 
2017 Thematic: Banking and the Limits of Professionalism 415
communities. However, as also examined in this Issue, 26  professionals are 
increasingly working like bankers in large corporations with national or 
worldwide office networks and a mobile and often international workforce. In 
essence, professions are themselves struggling to fit the archetypes of traditional 
professionalism. Commentators have pointed out that the variety of failures of 
technical competence and ethical conduct in finance has not excluded 
professionals at whose door a portion of responsibility must be laid for the 
damage done to financial resilience by the GFC and other economic failures.27 
They might wonder how and why professionalising would succeed in improving 
occupational conduct standards where state regulation has failed and when 
professions themselves have also failed. 
Notwithstanding these views, writers on the professions understand that some 
of how professional control and its related privilege are secured and advanced 
continues to be through local political and social legitimacy or some form of 
public connection. This control and its basis have not been entirely impaired by 
their increasingly vast and variable business environments. As Breakey argues, 
the demand for professional standards and conduct may come not only from 
professionals themselves, but from clients and the wider public who benefit from 
the goods of professional work. 28  There are also several motivations for the 
supply of the ‘ethical materiel’ of professions that are not just spurred by 
business advantage, but by more metaphysical and personal factors.29 Further, as 
we have signalled, these conceptions of professionalism and business are 
archetypes, ideal-type constructions with primarily heuristic, rather than 
descriptive, qualities and functions.30 
Other authors writing about what it might take to professionalise the financial 
sector have recognised this need to inculcate values and invigorate other-
regarding cultures in banking, including a duty to the public interest.31 However, 
much of this opinion has focused narrowly on the benefit to customers, criticising 
practices ‘that reward high-risk, short-term strategies [as] a clear indicator of a 
culture where the customer is not at the centre of how the business is run’.32 Hall 
and Appleyard’s empirical work emphasises the role of in-house firm training as 
                                                 
26  Ibid; Hugh Breakey and Charles Sampford, ‘Employed Professionals’ Ethical Responsibilities in Public 
Service and Private Enterprise: Dilemma, Priority and Synthesis’ (2017) 40 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 262. 
27  John C Coffee, Jr, ‘Understanding Enron: It’s about the Gatekeepers, Stupid’ (2002) 57 The Business 
Lawyer 1403; John C Coffee Jr, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
28  Breakey, above n 15, 1. 
29  Ibid 1 (emphasis added). Breakey considers desirable role identity; a desire for standards of excellence; 
adherence to common morality such as honesty, integrity and fairness; meeting expectations of tacit or 
regulative contracts with society and a desire for social admiration of their work. 
30  Muzio and Flood, above n 12, 372. 
31  Boatright, above n 2; van de Ven, above n 2; British Broadcasting Corporation, above n 2. 
32  Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Risk Outlook 2013’ (2013) 6, quoted in Roger McCormick and Chris 
Stears, ‘Banks: Conduct Costs, Cultural Issues and Steps towards Professionalism’ (2014) 8 Law and 
Financial Markets Review 134, 136. 
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distinct from university education in embedding this view.33 Our contribution 
here is in extending what we could expect of banking by applying the full range 
of the established elements of professional logic, which is significantly wider 
than simply ‘putting clients first’. As mentioned, professionalism has several 
interests and beneficiaries, including the client, but also the government, 
professional entities and associations, professionals themselves and, most 
importantly for the initial and continuing recognition of an occupation as a 
profession, the public and wider community. In outlining what we are looking for 
as features of professionalism, we note that we are dealing here with a 
phenomenon that can be observed and measured in myriad ways, right down to 
personal conscience and integrity. Recognising this and to provide limits on our 
article, we examine three central demands or duties of professionalism imposed 
on individuals that allow us to best capture and explore the selflessness that is not 
always observed in professions, but should be. 
To set up our argument in Part II, we outline two of the leading difficulties of 
regulating banking, namely the focus on controlling entities in the sector and 
their scale and complexity, and the ubiquitous presence of high remuneration for 
individuals (or at least an expectation of it). In Parts III, IV and V, we examine in 
detail the fit between banking and the professional duty to the public, duty to the 
client and duty to peers and to the profession respectively. In Part VI, we analyse 
another element of traditional professions: the role of professional associations. 
Associations are both representatives and regulators, and we consider particularly 
the challenges they face in the enforcement of professional duties in the banking 
sector. After reviewing the three central professional duties and associations, we 
conclude that banking faces challenges in trying to professionalise as an entire 
occupational group. This, in turn, raises the question about what professionalism 
and professions might still have to offer, even if it seems impossible to fully 
professionalise such a vast industry, at least as a whole. On this subsequent 
question of what banking might look like if it were to truly professionalise, we 
make some opening suggestions for a longer program of research, 
acknowledging that, as the sector is already highly regulated, professional duties 
will have to work alongside regulation and regulatory agency involvement. 
Finally, by examining the limits of professionalism in the banking sector, by 
inference, our argument also considers whether in other occupations, demands 
for professionalising can be realised and, if they cannot, what professional logic 
may still have to offer. 
Before beginning on the substance of our argument, there is one further vital 
clarification. We speak from our title onwards about ‘banking’. However, we use 
it as a shorthand term for ‘banking and finance’, for in the powerful national and 
global institutions we are considering, banks and other non-banking financial 
institutions operate intertwined. Except to save words, it makes no sense to 
consider one without the other. Prior to the deregulation of stock exchanges in 
                                                 
33  Sarah Hall and Lindsey Appleyard, ‘“City of London, City of Learning”? Placing Business Education 
within the Geographies of Finance’ (2009) 9 Journal of Economic Geography 597, 609. 
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the United States (‘US’) and the UK34 most of the credit and investment functions 
in financial markets were conducted by separate, independent businesses.35 The 
overall effect of deregulation was their acquisition by large, often global entities, 
which were usually commercial banks or investment banks. This conglomeration 
of what had previously been separate financial functions of credit provision, on 
the one side, and a variety of investment functions, on the other, has led to the 
intertwining of banking and finance. In particular, it has resulted in the 
hybridisation of financial products melded from these two elements. The 
securitisation and sale as investments of US housing loans mentioned in the 
opening as a cause of the GFC is one example of this melding of credit and 
investment arising from the conglomeration of functions associated with 
amalgamation of ownership. As the reader will see, many of the difficulties of 
professionalising are connected with these intertwined consequences of 
deregulation: large conglomerate organisations offering clients products and 
services from related parties within the organisation and associated conflicts of 
interest and risk. 
 
II   TWO PROBLEMS WITH BANKING: COMPLEX 
ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION 
In this Part, we concentrate on two important obstacles to good governance 
and conduct: complex banking organisations and individual remuneration. We do 
this to point out the limits of legislative and regulatory agency action and to 
demonstrate the conduct and compliance gap that professionalising banking 
might fill. 
The GFC and the accompanying disappearance of bank credit demonstrated 
the umbilical connection between banking and business prosperity, and the 
linkages to wealth, employment and tax revenue.36 The disregard of financial 
safety in risky transactions, where a professional might have had influence, 
                                                 
34  After the so-called ‘Big Bang’ at the London Stock Exchange on 27 October 1986, rules requiring fixed 
minimum commissions were abolished, along with the ‘single capacity’ rule which separated the work of 
stockbrokers, who acted for investors, and that of ‘jobbers’ (or ‘market makers’ as known in Australia 
and the United States), who made a market by holding lines of stock available for purchase. Also 
abolished was the requirement that both brokers and jobbers should be independent and not part of any 
wider financial group. The stock exchange rules excluding all foreigners from stock exchange 
membership were also abolished. Similar reforms had begun at the New York Stock Exchange when the 
Securities Exchange Commission abolished fixed commissions for all trades of $500 000 and above in 
1973. Other exchanges around the world eventually followed suit in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
35  In the US this separation was originally required by and substantially because of the Banking Act of 1933, 
Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (1933), universally known as the ‘Glass-Steagall Act’. The financial sector 
changed because of deregulation at the stock exchanges, and also because of repeal of parts of the Glass-
Steagall Act by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999, Pub L 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999). These changes 
in US banks had influence wherever they did business. 
36  For an outline of the scale of the impact of the GFC and the extensive measures required to remedy this, 
see Barack Obama and the Council of Economic Advisers, ‘Economic Report of the President: Together 
with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers’ (Report, The White House, January 2017) 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2017_economic_report_of_ 
president.pdf>. 
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eventually accumulated in devastating losses to individuals 37  and damage to 
economic prosperity and the welfare of the global public. The resulting loss of 
trust in banking institutions and personnel was compounded by the revelation of 
misconduct involved in setting the LIBOR interest rate. Over nearly a century, 
banking has accrued some of the most complex and extensive regimes of 
regulation in developed economies. In the wake of the GFC and LIBOR crises, 
these were subject to intense scrutiny for having failed to prevent poor conduct. 
They also underwent considerable reform; yet, as seems to be a widely held 
opinion, the changes have not been as effective as hoped. This disappointment is 
one of the factors that have led to greater emphasis on individual ethics and 
conduct, and demands for professionalism in the sector. 
 
A   Organisational Restructuring and Reform 
Although there are aspects of banking regulation that impose responsibility 
and accountability on individuals, the basic unit of regulatory attention is the 
provider entity. This is primarily through the regulatory techniques of licensing, 
mandating capital and other resources for the proper conduct of the business, 
entity supervision and, if appropriate, enforcement and sanctions against the 
entity, such as fines.38 While lately more attention is being given to responsible 
persons or managers,39 the calibre of personnel, and ‘risk culture’ in regulatory 
standards, 40  it is still mainly seen as an entity requirement to have proper 
capabilities and resources, not a question of individual ethical or legal 
responsibility. This concentration on entity regulation is one of the myriad 
structural features that act as obstacles to professionalism in banking. 
Further, most financial institutions present critical problems of scale, 
concentration, complexity and interconnection, combined with digital technology 
operating at the speed of light. These represent what appear as insuperable 
structural challenges to managers, professionals and regulators trying to do the 
right thing.41 In these circumstances, there is a question whether the logic of 
                                                 
37  Susan Bell Research, ‘Compensation for Retail Investors: The Social Impact of Monetary Loss’ (Report 
No 240, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 19 May 2011). 
38  But see criticisms of the US Securities Exchange Commission prosecution settlements against US banks 
by Justice Jed Rakoff: Nate Raymond, ‘Judge Criticizes Lack of Prosecution against Wall Street 
Executives for Fraud’, Reuters (online), 12 November 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-
judge-idUSBRE9AC00O20131113>. 
39  See Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 8–9. 
40  See, eg, Ian Laughlin, ‘Stay Ahead of the Risk: Risk Governance and Risk Culture’ (Speech delivered at 
the Institute of Actuaries of Australia, Sydney, 20 May 2013) <http://www.apra.gov.au/Speeches/ 
Documents/Ian-Laughlin-IAA-20-May-2013.pdf>; Jonathon Shapiro, ‘APRA Steps Up Culture Crusade 
as ASIC Rate Probe Heats Up’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 11 February 2016 <http://www.smh. 
com.au/business/banking-and-finance/apra-steps-up-culture-crusade-as-asic-rate-probe-heats-up-
20160210-gmqtv4.html>; Greg Medcraft, Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, ‘Good Corporate Culture, Values and Ethics’ (Speech delivered at the Launch of 
Governance Institute of Australia’s Inaugural Ethics Index, Sydney, 20 July 2016) <http://download. 
asic.gov.au/media/3951997/greg-medcraft-speech-launch-of-governance-institute-inaugural-ethics-index-
20-july-2016.pdf>. 
41  Stijn Claessens, Richard J Herring and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘A Safer World Financial System: Improving 
the Resolution of Systemic Institutions’ (Geneva Reports on the World Economy No 12, International 
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professionalism runs the risk of exposing individuals to an impossible task of 
maintaining conduct standards in a profoundly inimical environment. Indeed, as 
other articles in this Issue argue,42 the position of professionals working in large 
organisations is evolving, even when the entities they are employed by are 
professional firms, rather than banks. Those articles also point out the need for, 
and the difficulties in, making professional firms themselves subject to 
professional obligations in order to better support individual professionals. 
The evidence of these structural challenges to individual action is seen in 
analysis from all major financial centres. Haldane, at the Bank of England, 
argues: 
The past fifty years have seen seismic shifts in the structure, size and composition 
of the global financial system. These changes gave birth to the too-big-to-fail 
problem … Accompanying this dramatic rise in banking scale has been an 
equally-dramatic rise in banking concentration.43 
The UK Parliamentary Banking Inquiry, referring to the losses incurred by 
British taxpayers in the government rescue packages following the GFC, found 
that ‘the events which led to that loss were the result of pervasive structural 
weaknesses, rather than the failings of a few individuals’.44 In the US, Philip 
Wallach has despaired that 
being a bank director has become ‘a job that passeth understanding’, requiring 
inhuman foresight and perspicacity. With hundreds of corporate subdivisions to 
oversee and many hundreds of requirements for the board members of 
[systemically important financial institutions], it is easy to see how capacity for 
oversight (both corporate and regulatory) can be overwhelmed.45 
Wallach cites Vincent Reinhart’s evidence to a US Senate Committee that: 
‘The opacity of byzantine corporate structures makes it impossible for regulators 
to do their jobs, for markets to evaluate firms’ stability or value, and for banks’ 
managers to run their companies safely’.46 
Along with the issues of the entity versus individuals and the size and 
complexity of group business forms, a further, crucial structural problem 
discussed in Part IV is the coexistence of retail and commercial banking services 
                                                                                                                         
Center for Monetary and Banking Studies and Centre for Economic Policy Research, July 2010) ch 1; 
Thomas M Hoenig and Charles S Morris, ‘Restructuring the Banking System to Improve Safety and 
Soundness’ (Paper, revised ed, December 2012); Karen Shaw Petrou, ‘A Job that Passeth Understanding: 
Or, Can Anyone Be a Bank Director Anymore?’ (Speech delivered at the 21st Annual Corporate 
Governance Conference, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 8 May 2012) 
<http://www.fedfin.com/images/stories/press_center/speeches/Kellogg%20School%20of%20 
Management_Speech.pdf>. 
42  Rogers, Kingsford Smith and Chellew, above n 21; Breakey and Sampford, above n 26. 
43  Andrew Haldane, ‘On Being the Right Size’ (Speech delivered at the Institute of Economic Affairs’ 22nd 
Annual Series, Institute of Directors, London, 25 October 2012) 2 <http://www.bis.org/review/ 
r121030d.pdf>. 
44  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 83. 
45  Philip Wallach, ‘Moving Beyond Calls for a “New Glass-Steagall”’ (2012) 51 Issues in Governance 
Studies 1, 12. 
46  Ibid; Evidence to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Congress, 
Washington DC, 23 July 2009 (Vincent Reinhart) <http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/ 
c00a4670-8edd-4a6e-947f-09afb555fa4d/33A699FF535D59925B69836A6E068FD0. reinhart 
testimony72309.pdf>. 
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working for the real economy with the bank’s own proprietary trading activities. 
The latter function serves purposes related to the financial economy and the 
banks’ profitability and has been the chief contributor to the growth, 
internationalisation and riskiness of bank activities. All these institutional 
features have been intensified following the financial crisis by the takeover of 
smaller competitors, augmenting systemic risk.47 
Arguments for reform to address these systemic risks include changes  
to achieve more effective competition, customer choice and better  
governance. These proposals and some actual reforms to the sector amount to a 
‘reassessment of the economic costs and benefits of universal banks’ 
involvement in proprietary trading and other securities markets activities’.48 The 
reforms have seen the development of different approaches49 for the renewed 
separation of ‘commercial’ and ‘investment’ banking, intended ‘to insulate 
certain types of financial activities regarded as especially important for the real 
economy, or significant on consumer or depositor protection grounds, from the 
risks that emanate from potentially riskier but less important activities’.50 In the 
US51 and the UK,52 and potentially throughout the European Union (‘EU’),53 these 
reforms to effect structural separation of ordinary banking business from riskier 
securities and proprietary trading are hoped to render banks safer and reduce the 
                                                 
47  Haldane, above n 43, 6; European Commission, ‘European Financial Stability and Integration’ (Working 
Document, April 2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/info/file/31532/download_en?token=woT7k0v5> 85; Hoenig 
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48  Leonardo Gambacorta and Adrian van Rixtel, ‘Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Approaches and 
Implications’ (Working Paper No 412, Bank for International Settlements, April 2013) 1. 
49  Ibid.  
50  Ibid. 
51  See, eg, the ‘Volcker Rule’, enacted in 2010, which aims to limit the extent to which commercial deposit-
taking banks, compared with investment banks, in the US can proprietary trade – that is, trade their own, 
rather than client, accounts: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC §§ 
5301–5641 (2012) (‘Dodd-Frank Act’). The full implementation of this Rule, however, continues to be 
delayed: see, eg, Olivia Oran, ‘Exclusive – Wall St Banks Ask Fed for 5 More Years to Comply with 
Volcker Rule’ CNBC (online), 11 August 2016 <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/11/reuters-america-
exclusive-wall-st-banks-ask-fed-for-5-more-years-to-comply-with-volcker-rule.html>. 
52  See, eg, Independent Commission on Banking, ‘Final Report: Recommendations’ (Government of the 
United Kingdom, September 2011) (‘Vickers Report’), which proposed that UK banks should ‘ring-
fence’ their commercial banking assets from their higher risk investment banking operations, including 
derivatives speculation. Subsequent enactment of the Vickers Report recommendations in the Financial 
Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (UK) are proposed to be fully implemented by 2019: Allen & Overy, 
Legal and Regulatory Risks for the Financial Sector: The Banking Reform Act 2013 
<http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/lrrfs/uk/Pages/The-Banking-Reform-Act-2013.aspx>. 
53  See, eg, High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, ‘Final Report’ 
(2 October 2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/ 
report_en.pdf> (‘Liikanen Report’). It proposed, among other things, that ‘proprietary trading and other 
significant trading activities should be assigned to a separate legal entity if the activities to be separated 
amount to a significant share of a bank’s business’: at iii. While this proposal has not been legislated, 
there has been active consideration across Europe of three broad forms of separation: (i) accounting 
separation, (ii) ‘subsidiarisation’ and (iii) ownership separation, ie prohibition of certain business lines. A 
range of entity arrangements have resulted along a spectrum from narrow trading entities with 
correspondingly broad deposit-taking entities through to broad trading entities with correspondingly 
narrow deposit entities: European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment’ (Working Document, 29 January 
2014) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/DOC/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0030&from=EN>. 
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risk of taxpayer exposure to bank losses.54 The changes should also prevent the 
considerable public subsidies enjoyed by banks, such as central bank lending 
facilities and deposit guarantee schemes, from applying beyond traditional 
banking which supports the real economy. Moreover, the changes might reduce 
the moral hazard contributing to riskier securities and proprietary trading: ‘By 
more credibly restricting the ambit of tax-payer funded creditor guarantees to 
depositors it could furnish these benefits more efficiently and cheaply from a 
social cost perspective’.55 While some of these reforms, such as those in the US 
Dodd-Frank Act’, 56  have been enacted, many of its supporting rules and 
regulations have yet to be finalised, resulting in ongoing implementation delays.57 
Although there is little discussion of professionalism as a concept in these 
initiatives,58 these are the structural platforms upon which professionalism must 
operate. The reforms should reduce the scale and complexity of banks, improve 
transparency and render banks easier to manage through individual and collective 
decision-making. The structural separation should reduce the scope for conflicts 
of interest and reduce aggressive risk cultures in ordinary banking. 
However, there remains a widespread sense internationally among regulators 
and others that many of the fundamental problems of the banking sector, which 
delivered the GFC and LIBOR misconduct, remain unresolved despite reforms. 
These issues were crystallised by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of 
England and Chair of the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’), in a letter to the 
Group of 20 (‘G20’) finance ministers and central bank governors in 2015, which 
drew our attention back to individual motivation and conduct: 
The scale of misconduct in some financial institutions has risen to a level that has 
the potential to create systemic risks. Fundamentally, it threatens to undermine 
trust in financial institutions and markets, thereby limiting some of the hard-won 
benefits of the initial reforms … Enforcement must remain a credible deterrent to 
misconduct and the FSB will consider the extent to which enhanced co-operation 
between conduct supervisors and greater consistency in the application of conduct 
regulations across jurisdictions can improve its effectiveness.59 
Carney went on to lay out a further agenda of work to reduce the likelihood 
of misconduct through assessing reforms to risk governance, compensation 
structures and benchmarks, and by considering ways to improve market structure, 
standards of practice and incentives for good conduct in financial markets more 
broadly.60 A critical point at which to commence these further reforms is the 
remuneration system of banking. This base is to ensure that incentives and 
disincentives more closely reflect the longer-run balance between business risks 
                                                 
54  Liikanen Report, above n 53; Haldane, above n 42. 
55  Julian T S Chow and Jay Surti, ‘Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It?’(Working Paper 
No 11/236, International Monetary Fund, November 2011) 4. 
56  12 USC §§ 5301–5641 (2012). 
57  See Oran, above n 51 and accompanying text. 
58  See, eg, in the US, the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5301–5641 (2012); in the UK, the Vickers Report, 
above n 52, and Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (UK); and, in the EU, the Liikanen 
Report, above n 53. 
59  Letter from Mark Carney to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 4 February 2015, 
quoted in European Commission, ‘European Financial Stability and Integration’, above n 47, 171. 
60  Ibid. 
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and rewards, with remuneration deferred in favour of long-term performance 
rather than awarded for short-term gains. It is to this question of individual 
remuneration in banking and its challenge to the professionalising of conduct in a 
regulated context that we now turn. 
 
B   Remuneration Reform 
The primacy of sales-driven, ultra-high remuneration as a contributing factor 
to risky conduct is clear in the evidence from reports of bank behaviour before 
the GFC, with the highly-geared, performance-oriented and hierarchical character 
of financial firms focused solely on efficiency and profit-making. Encouraged by 
individual remuneration linked to sales revenue and bank profits, this culture 
overwhelmed the older ideas of client and public service, which some parts of 
banking allegedly once had. This is demonstrated by the KPMG Report on the 
management of UBS before the financial crisis: 
The IB [investment bank] was focused on the maximization of revenue. There 
appears to have been a lack of challenge on the risk and reward to business area 
plans within the investment bank at a senior level. UBS’s [internal] review 
suggests an asymmetric focus in the IB Senior Management meetings on revenue 
and P&L [profit and loss], especially when compared to discussion of risk issues 
… it remains the case that bonus payments for successful and senior IB 
[investment bank] Fixed Income traders, including those in the businesses holding 
Subprime positions were significant. Essentially, bonuses were measured against 
gross revenue after personnel costs, with no formal account taken of the quality 
and sustainability of those earnings.61 
The 2010 report to UBS shareholders concluded: 
Remuneration systems that placed excessive emphasis on the net new money 
criterion in the cross-border sector, and which excluded risk-allocated costs in 
connection with financing at the Investment Bank, did not create incentives for 
sustainable growth.62 
Such approaches to incentives were widespread in the international banking 
industry at the time, as the international audit institutions subsequently 
concluded: 
Financial institution compensation practices that reinforced lax underwriting and 
excessive risk taking has also been a contributor of the financial crisis. 
Specifically, financial institutions created distorted incentives for employees by 
rewarding the volume of loan or securitized transaction origination over long-term 
asset quality.63 
The Bank of England concluded in the years leading up to the financial crisis 
that bonus payments more than doubled in the finance and insurance industry, 
which considerably outpaced growth in gross domestic product in the wider 
economy. Excessive incentives included rewarding high short-term profits with 
generous bonuses and encouraging excessive risk-taking that did not consider the 
                                                 
61  UBS, ‘Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs’ (18 April 2008) 34, 42. 
62  UBS, ‘Transparency Report to the Shareholders of UBS AG’ (2010) 60 <http://www.cdt.ch/files/docs/ 
795404f7d134b0f00b061d172c661abf.pdf>. 
63  Swedish National Audit Office, ‘The Causes of the Global Financial Crisis and Their Implications for 
Supreme Audit Institutions’ (Report, 2010) [24]. 
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long-term risks created for banks and for wider society.64 The Bank of England 
report outlines how the UK Prudential Regulation Authority’s remuneration rules 
for banks have changed the structure of remuneration in the industry, which 
supports the direction of the global policy agenda on financial remuneration. 
Prior to the financial crisis, patterns of bank remuneration showed no restrictions 
on the size of variable remuneration relative to fixed remuneration, nor were 
there restrictions on how much of variable remuneration packages were paid out 
in cash versus non-cash benefits, such as shares. As we have summarised above, 
performance measures used to determine variable remuneration packages relied 
heavily on revenue and profit metrics that were not adjusted for the risks taken. 
There were no regulatory requirements in relation to payment deferral, ‘malus’65 
or clawback of variable remuneration paid. 
Following the GFC, there was a concerted effort, which still continues, at the 
international, national and institutional level, to reconceive the remuneration 
prevailing in the banking sector around principles relating to proper governance 
of compensation, effective alignment of compensation with risk-taking  
and effective supervision and engagement by stakeholders.66 The International 
Monetary Fund supported a range of initiatives to introduce bonus clawbacks, 
longer vesting periods and other arrangements more carefully calibrated towards 
long-term growth. 67  The FSB has maintained a review of the compensation 
practices of significant financial institutions and is committed to enhanced public 
disclosure and transparency of bank compensation and enhanced supervisory 
oversight at the national level.68 The Dodd-Frank Act69 in the US contained key 
measures giving shareholders ‘say on pay’ votes, increased disclosure and 
transparency, and new standards for integrity and accuracy of executive 
compensation. This included the recovery of excess remuneration and payments 
based on misreported financial information. The US Federal Reserve reported on 
the traction of these remuneration reforms including in terms of risk adjustments 
and deferring payouts at 25 large US banks.70 
                                                 
64  Marilena Angeli and Shahzad Gitay, Bank of England, ‘Bonus Regulation: Aligning Reward with Risk in 
the Banking Sector’ (2015) 55 Quarterly Bulletin 322. 
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66  Financial Stability Board, ‘FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’ (Principles Statement, 2 
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68  Financial Stability Board, ‘National Regulation and Supervisory Guidance on Compensation’ 
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In the EU, full implementation71 of the proposals emanating from the FSB has 
been supported by regulators. This includes capping the ratio of variable to fixed 
compensation at 1:1, which can be increased to 2:1 if approved by a super-
majority of at least 66 per cent of shareholders. Bonus, malus and clawback 
clauses must apply to 100 per cent of variable compensation and at least 40 per 
cent of each executive’s bonus (and 60 per cent of each senior executive’s bonus) 
must be deferred. Detailed disclosure of remuneration practices is required from 
large institutions with information on the link between pay and performance, and 
aggregate figures of remuneration. As the EU Directive states: 
Remuneration policies which encourage excessive risk-taking behaviour can 
undermine sound and effective risk management of credit institutions and 
investment firms. Members of the G-20 committed themselves to implementing 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
and Implementing Standards, which address the potentially detrimental effect of 
poorly designed remuneration structures on the sound management of risk and 
control of risk-taking behaviour by individuals. This Directive aims to implement 
international principles and standards at [European] Union level by introducing an 
express obligation for credit institutions and investment firms to establish and 
maintain, for categories of staff whose professional activities have a material 
impact on the risk profile of credit institutions and investment firms, remuneration 
policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management.72 
In the UK, the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008 followed 
immediately upon a reckless highly-incentivised ascent to becoming, by 
acquisition, the largest bank in the world. This was despite Royal Bank of 
Scotland and HBOS, which also failed, both receiving substantial regulatory 
reviews, followed by detailed Parliamentary Treasury Committee inquiries which 
kept the subject of risk management and executive compensation in the banking 
sector firmly in public focus. This has continued up to the present.73 A highlight 
in this process was a resolute report subsequently published by the 2013  
UK Parliamentary Banking Inquiry. 74  Mandatory rules of the UK Prudential 
Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority now require a bonus 
cap. This sets a maximum variable-to-fixed remuneration ratio of 2:1 and 
requires shareholder approval.75 All variable remuneration should be composed 
                                                 
71  See Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Access to 
the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment 
Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] 
OJ L 176/338. 
72  Ibid 345. 
73  Financial Services Authority, ‘The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority 
Board Report’ (Report, December 2011); Treasury Committee, The FSA’s Report into the Failure of RBS, 
House of Commons Paper No 640, Session 2012–2013 (2012); Prudential Regulatory Authority and 
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘The Failure of HBOS Plc (HBOS): A Report by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)’ (Report, November 2015); Treasury 
Committee, Review of the Reports into the Failure of HBOS, House of Commons Paper No 582, Session 
2016–2017 (2016). 
74  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4. 
75  Exercising powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), enforced by the Financial 
Conduct Authority and to be applied to all major risk takers including senior managers in large financial 
institutions from 2016: see Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority, 
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of 50 per cent cash and 50 per cent non-cash, and only 40 per cent of all variable 
remuneration should be paid up-front with 60 per cent deferred. All deferred 
remuneration, which has not yet vested, can be subjected to malus to take 
account of instances of misconduct, risk management failings or downturn in 
financial performance. 76  The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority has 
confined itself to including remuneration of senior managers in a series of 
disclosures regarding capital adequacy and risk management.77 In relation to sales 
of financial products with advice, legislation in Australia has banned conflicted 
remuneration structures, including commissions and volume-based payments,78 
though there are wide exemptions for simple banking and insurance products 
which staff at front counter are incentivised to sell.79 
In principle, this raft of international reforms might provide a more stable 
incentive structure that could be adapted to stress greater responsibility in 
decision-making, though at this stage there is little evidence of any significant 
reductions in the overall level of executive reward in banking.80 However, even in 
this more reflective phase of banking, the language and critique concentrates on 
damage to the profitability and reputation of the bank as an entity, its employees 
and its shareholders. Nothing in the assessments from the experts or the banks, 
set out above, contains thinking about a duty to the client.81 Likewise, there is no 
discussion of bankers having a duty to act in the public interest and how banking 
might have any wider social utility or confer a public benefit.82 Rather, when it 
became clear in 2012 that traders at leading international banks were centrally 
involved with fixing the LIBOR, the facts were clear that the manipulation was 
designed to benefit the bank and themselves. 
In his discussion of the development of professional ethical norms, Breakey 
presents the idea of ‘spoilers’ and ‘facilitators’ of that development and their 
importance in ‘the construction, reform or continuance of a professional ethos’.83 
It is tempting to conclude that, on the fragile and unpropitious terrain of banking 
                                                                                                                         
PS12/15, FCA PS15/16, June 2015) <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ 
ps/2015/ps1215.pdf>. 
76  Ibid 331. 
77  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Prudential Standard APS 330: Public Disclosure, APS 330-
1, June 2013 <http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/PrudentialFramework/Documents/APS-330-June-2013.pdf>. 
78  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A div 2 sub-div C, as amended by Corporations Amendment (Future 
of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 1 and Corporations Amendment (Further Future of 
Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 33. See also Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (‘ASIC’), FOFA – Background and Implementation (23 March 2016) <http://asic.gov.au/ 
regulatory-resources/financial-services/future-of-financial-advice-reforms/fofa-background-and-
implementation/>. 
79  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963B–963D. See also Clancy Yeates, ‘Union Calls for Consistency on 
Advice Rules’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 10 September 2016, 3. 
80  Global Financial Stability Report, above n 66, 115. 
81  Cf Greg Smith, Why I Left Goldman Sachs: A Wall Street Story (Grand Central Publishing, 2014) 296-
299.  
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University Press, 2016); Paul Volcker, ‘The Only Useful Thing the Banks Have Invented in 20 Years Is 
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on which we transplant professionalism, remuneration remains a ‘spoiler’ for 
which there are few responses. It is often argued that remuneration in banking is 
a decisive marker of commercial norms to which professionalism is thought to  
be an alternative. However, as the other articles in this Issue reveal, 84  in 
remuneration, as in other areas, the differences between business and professions 
are not always as great as portrayed. While hourly fees still govern much, if not 
most, professional remuneration and are sometimes held up as the antidote to 
incentivised remuneration in business,85 the billable hour too has its deficiencies 
as a prompt to professional standards and values.86 
Moreover, while it is true that in the professions those who serve best may 
earn high fees, those fees can never be the central justification of a profession.87 
By comparison, models of remuneration in banking directly link extremes in 
ultra-high remuneration to sales-driven revenue and profits of entities. It is 
difficult to see how these models are compatible with a duty to put clients’ 
interests first or to act in the public interest. 88  While there is no doubt that 
changing fee models are a challenge for professional practice, the fees are simply 
not as great (and potentially distorting) in the professions as they are in banking. 
Second, professional fees still relate to advice and not to profit from a bank’s 
own competing proprietary deals,89 which we discuss below. The questions we 
now turn to are whether and to what degree it is possible that banking might 
adopt the central duties and structures of the professions, despite the incentives of 
remuneration and the relative anonymity of decision-making and conduct in large 
complex organisations. How might professional duties spur ideals over 
interests?90 How might they improve decisions and conduct where regulation has 
in part failed to do so? 
 
III   BANKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
As the earlier articles in this Issue have established, professional logic holds 
that the relative independence and privilege of associational regulation and, by 
extension, the professions, are part of a notional ‘regulative bargain’ with 
government and society. In exchange for autonomy, it is argued, the professions 
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and professionals have a duty to support the important institutions associated 
with the practice of their profession.  
To be clear, we do not persist with the argument that banking should identify 
and commit to a general public good only because of a blind adherence to 
professional logic. Rather, we agree with Boatright’s comments (considered 
further below) in relation to oaths: ‘oaths in their most common uses are largely 
affirmations of a commitment to service that are embedded in a larger 
institutional framework that is absent in banking’.91 Our argument here is that the 
identification of a ‘larger institutional framework’92 helps motivate individual 
commitment. If finance is to change into something more beneficial than risky 
business linked to high remuneration and profitability, a commitment is required 
by both the entity and cognitively and behaviourally by individual bankers. We 
assert that oaths, codes of conduct and practice, and extensions of professional 
frameworks, such as Sampford’s ethical integrity systems,93 can help motivation 
by crystallising these ‘larger institutional frameworks’. 
There is practical, experiential support for this view from banking itself. In 
2013, the Salz Review94 examined the conduct of Barclays Bank in the setting of 
LIBOR, the first bank identified as having manipulated this globally influential 
interest rate.95 This conduct resulted in Barclays ultimately having to pay fines of 
close to half a billion US dollars.96 The Review concluded that poor conduct 
could thrive in a group where ‘there was no sense of common purpose … And 
across the whole bank, there were no clearly articulated and understood shared 
values’.97 We suggest there is considerable overlap between Boatright’s ‘larger 
institutional frameworks’ and the Salz Committee’s ‘sense of common purpose 
… and shared values’. The absence of purpose leaves room for the development 
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of unhealthy cultures and sub-cultures such as that which surrounded the 
manipulation of LIBOR, not only at Barclays but across the sector.98 
The obvious responses to advocacy of a beneficial or public interest purpose 
for banking are, firstly, that even traditional professions articulate and realise a 
public interest duty imperfectly. Secondly, the evidence of greater ethical 
motivation derived from shared purpose or values is questionable and related to 
the equally contestable assertion that the professions are more ethical than 
occupations. Before turning to the question of what banking might adopt as its 
public interest purpose were it to professionalise, we address these two 
objections. 
As acknowledged in the opening article in this Issue,99 traditional professions 
have undergone drastic changes and many of their organisations are adopting 
both the logic and arrangements of business: ‘Professional identities are 
increasingly framed around logics of efficiency and commerce, which have 
displaced traditional logics of ethics and public service’.100 Yet, accepting the 
views of writers who have emphasised, following Larson, the self-seeking 
inherent in the market and status ‘projects’ of professional advancement,101 the 
public interest remains one of the ‘normative, coercive, and mimetic pressures’ 
of professionalism.102 Further, because government and the public ‘are not totally 
gullible’103 and professional legitimacy is tied to the regulative bargain, the public 
interest cannot be merely a self-serving ideology, even if the commitment to it is 
not entirely enacted. Indeed, one problem with the market control critique is that 
it obscures the fuller roles professions play in social life.104 Halliday rejects this 
market paradigm because it fails to go ‘beyond monopoly’ to capture the broader 
set of motivations besides self-interest that guide professional action105 and so 
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enforceable-undertaking-from-bnp-paribas/>; ASIC, ‘ASIC Accepts Enforceable Undertaking from the 
Royal Bank of Scotland’ (Media Release, 14-169MR, 21 July 2014); ASIC, ‘ASIC Accepts Enforceable 
Undertaking from UBS’ (Media Release, 13-366MR, 23 December 2013). 
99  See Rogers, Kingsford Smith and Chellew, above n 21. 
100  Daniel Muzio, David M Brock and Roy Suddaby, ‘Professions and Institutional Change: Towards an 
Institutionalist Sociology of the Professions’ (2013) 50 Journal of Management Studies 699, 700. 
101  See, eg, Richard L Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1988); 
Richard L Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism (Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
102  Muzio, Brock and Suddaby, above n 100, 702. 
103  Keith M Macdonald, The Sociology of the Professions (Sage Publications, 1995) 35. 
104  Muzio, Brock and Suddaby, above n 100, 701. 
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(University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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account for the normative value of professionalism.106 While accepting Larson’s 
insights about some of the primary means by which professions acquire and 
maintain control over their definition as professions,107  professionalism as an 
appeal to quality, social trusteeship and public interest remains part of their 
means of control. Indeed, it is because professions have historically tried and still 
try to give their activities a particular normative value beyond their technical 
requirements108 that they have attracted interest in diagnosing the failure of values 
and governance in banking. Moreover, we must expect this public ethos of 
professions and, for that matter, banking. We are not about to ‘fix our heart 
valves ourselves, invest our money without any advice, sue a corporation that has 
wronged us without any professional representation’.109 Despite the changes and 
critique, then, we continue to expect professions to deal with ‘the complex issues 
that advanced modernity hands our way’.110 
The second objection is scepticism that Boatright’s ‘larger institutional 
frameworks’ and the Salz Committee’s ‘sense of common purpose … and shared 
values’ motivate professional or prosocial behaviour. More specifically, it 
questions whether intrinsic ethical attitudes, through ‘professional’ beliefs, 
values, education and socialisation, or extrinsically motivated ethical attitudes, 
through professional codes, regulation and other controls, actually link to better, 
prosocial behaviour. Do these features of professionalism make professionals act 
in less selfish, less profit-oriented ways than non-professionals? Or are their 
public interests claims, and even beliefs and motivations, rhetorical justifications 
or, less cynically, self-beliefs that do not connect to routine ethical action? 
Assessing this issue represents an immense conceptual challenge, particularly 
without an obvious comparator control group to study. We cannot assess 
whether, for example, doctors would act differently without their Hippocratic 
Oath or disciplinary bodies. There have been very few comparative studies 
between professions and non-professions, though there are individual studies  
on specific behaviour. For example, one study demonstrated that lawyers are  
less willing to lie in negotiations than business executives are. 111  While not 
comparative, there is a deep vein of research to suggest that economics and 
finance students, as future bankers, become less public-minded over the course of 
their studies.112 It indicates that immersion in the study of economics, with its 
conceptual models based on the idea of rationally self-interested homo 
                                                 
106  Muzio, Brock and Suddaby, above n 102, 703. 
107  Professionalism is not inherent to any occupation, but is instead a means of organising and controlling an 
occupation: ibid 702. 
108  Ibid 713. 
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Future of Professional Work’ (2016) 3 Journal of Professions and Organization 103, 13–14. 
110  Ibid.  
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economicus, induces behaviour away from cooperation and altruism.113 Similarly, 
Bandura includes the use of euphemistic or ‘sanitizing’ language as a key 
‘manoeuvre’ in moral disengagement.114 Nonetheless, there have been similar 
findings for legal education and law students as professionals.115 
To make matters more difficult, we are arguing for professional beliefs and 
practices knowing 
there are a number of competing and overlapping frameworks for deciding what 
the standard [of ethical behaviour] is:  
 have key rules or duties been adhered to (akin to either deontological or 
compliance approaches)?  
 are the consequences of actions ethical (usually seen as a utilitarian approach);  
 does character, experience and thoughtful reflection on experience suggest the 
approach is ethical (broadly, the virtue ethics approach)?  
 is a decision sufficiently informed by one’s relationships with all interested 
parties (the relational approach) [or stakeholder approach, we discuss later]? 
and,  
 a combination of all or some of the above in the light of a particular ethical 
problem’s context (the contextual approach).116 
Again to complicate the issue, ethics research is problematic because it tends 
to rely on self-reporting and ethics is one area of research in which the tendency 
to present an idealised self is high. Furthermore, research has demonstrated 
different levels of ethicality between professions and within them. Context plays 
a considerable and increasing role over the practices of professionals, who 
interpret and apply their professional codes differently.117 For example, Moorhead 
and Hinchley have shown how corporate lawyers in particular understand ethics 
in minimal, ‘so long as not illegal or dishonest’ terms, with a strong client-
                                                 
113  Ibid, citing Robert H Frank, Thomas Gilovich and Dennis T Regan, ‘Does Studying Economics Inhibit 
Cooperation?’ (1993) 7 Journal of Economic Perspectives 159; Robert H Frank, Thomas D Gilovich and 
Dennis T Regan, ‘Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?’ (1996) 10 Journal of Economic Perspectives 187; 
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Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play’ (1996) 10 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 177. 
114  Albert Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’ (1999) 3 Personality and 
Social Psychology Review 193. 
115  Although, the situation is more complex than the diminished ethicality effect: see Kennon M Sheldon and 
Lawrence S Krieger, ‘Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating 
Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well‐Being’ (2004) 22 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 261. 
Indeed, there is evidence that law school both strengthens and weakness ethical identity: Richard 
Moorhead et al, ‘The Ethical Identity of Law Students’ (2016) 23 International Journal of the Legal 
Profession 235. There is also evidence that legal education – and practice – have a neutral impact on the 
values informing ethical decision-making and decision-making here must be seen as deriving from a wide 
set of ethical values: Adrian Evans and Josephine Palermo, ‘Zero Impact: Are Lawyers’ Values Affected 
by Law School?’ (2005) 8 Legal Ethics 240. 
116  Richard Moorhead et al, ‘Designing Ethics Indicators for Legal Services Provision’ (Working Paper No 
1, Centre for Ethics and Law, September 2012) 20. See at 22–4, 28–33 for reasons why ethics research is 
difficult and therefore requires a range of methods. 
117  For the legal profession example, see Leslie C Levin and Lynn Mather (eds), Lawyers in Practice: 
Ethical Decision Making in Context (University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
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interest focus.118 There is variability in individual values too in law school, some 
of which trace to gender and career intentions.119 Perhaps as some indication that 
professionals are more ethical than banker-types, there is strong evidence that 
law students with ‘professional’ career aspirations are more orientated towards 
work that primarily deals with people rather than money120 and have stronger 
‘moral identities’, than those intending to pursue business law.121 
At its core, the issue remains whether or not our beliefs and motivations 
affect our behaviour. The research on moral behaviour shows that it is made  
up of awareness, analysis, motivation and action.122 This framework has been 
challenged by more recent research which shows that ethical decision-making is 
often automatic and innate.123  However, this earlier and continuing strand of 
research has demonstrated that certain characteristics of moral issues affect the 
process of ethical decision-making – most decisively, how it is framed and 
analysed. These qualities include the magnitude of the consequences, social 
consensus dimensions,124 the presence of a moral language in that context,125 and 
whether the individual has developed a moral identity from their moral (here, 
professional) beliefs.126 Motivation is then crucial for all moral decision-makers, 
including professionals who can be aware and engage in moral reasoning and yet 
not feel obliged to act ethically. 
There are reasons to believe that professionalism has certain positive effects 
or has the potential to have positive effects on action. Professionalism comprises 
a set of beliefs, language and practices that defines membership. It allows the 
possibility, then, for moral issues to involve a public interest language and social 
consensus and sanctions, through leadership, community, celebration and 
discipline, and therefore for higher ethical behaviour. Professionalism is an 
interpretive frame that includes ethical principles and considerations. As the 
codes, cases and educational materials attest, these centre on honesty, trust, 
civility and competence. They also extend to the development of expert 
knowledge and institutional infrastructure, pro bono work, and reform.127 These 
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features exist in other occupations, however not as much as they do for 
professions, even though some of these are under immense strain. 
Professionalism makes engagement more likely, or disengagement less likely, 
because it involves a strong language of responsibility to an institution. What is 
at stake if the members disengage with moral duties is salient. As mentioned, 
these factors are associated with ethical behaviour.128 In addition, if people are 
able to practise ethical behaviour, it is more likely to be part of their identity, 
which in turn supports the behaviour129 and, by extension, their institutions.130  
In the next section, we focus on two practices or reifications of this public 
interest purpose and commitment: the professional oath and codes of professional 
conduct. 
 
A   Professional Oaths 
Our question is, then, what important institution conferring public benefit 
might bankers agree or promise to uphold above all else, to earn legitimacy and 
develop self-consciousness as a profession? What could banking promise to 
deliver in order to come to a supposed regulative bargain with the state of the 
type foundational to traditional professions, allowing it to earn at least a degree 
of regulatory autonomy? Searching for such a public interest or purpose we 
compare three new bankers’ oaths recently formulated: the Dutch bankers’ 
oath,131 which since 1 April 2013 has been part of the Dutch Wet op het financieel 
toezicht [Financial Supervision Act] (Netherlands) stb-2006-475; a British one 
proposed and promoted by ResPublica, a non-party political public policy 
research organisation which released the oath in 2014 though it has not been 
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129  Ibid 963. 
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131   This oath, which enjoys legislative backing, originated in the Dutch Banking Association Banking Code 
2010. Parts of the Banking Code were converted into legislative requirements after a 2013 review: 
Herman Wijffels et al, ‘Towards a Serviceable and Stable Banking System’ (Report, Commission on the 
Structure of Dutch Banks, June 2013) (‘Wijffels Review’). In 2014, the Dutch Banking Association 
produced a document which includes not only a social charter, banking code and rules of conduct, but 
also a ‘Bankers’ Oath’, which provides: 
I swear/promise within the limits of the position I hold at any time in the banking sector: 
 I will execute my function ethically and with care; 
 I will draw a careful balance between the interests of all parties associated with the business, being 
the customers, shareholders, employees and the society in which the business operates; 
 When drawing that balance, I will make the customers’ interests central; 
 I will comply with the laws, regulations and codes of conduct that apply to me; 
 I will keep confidential that which has been entrusted to me; 
 I will not abuse my knowledge; 
 I will act openly and accountably and I know my responsibility to society; 
 I will make every effort to retain and improve trust in the financial sector. 
So help me God/This I declare and promise. 
 Dutch Banking Association, ‘Oath and Discipline’ (Dutch Banking Association trans) (Publication, 14 
October 2014) [trans of: Bankierseed] <https://www.nvb.nl/publicaties/gedragscodes/1400/bankierseed-
bankers-oath-toekomstgericht-bankieren.html>. 
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officially adopted, 132  which we call the ‘ResPublica oath’; and, thirdly, the 
Australian Banking and Finance Oath developed by a specially formed civil 
society organisation, to which signatories subscribe.133  We have included the 
texts of these oaths in the footnotes. We are not so naive as to think that oaths can 
so change behaviour as to hold back the tide of poor banking and financial 
behaviour single-handedly. However, we do think that reviewing bankers’ oaths 
may serve to make transparent and crystallise what bankers think are the core 
purposes of their occupation, including public ones. 
Oaths are closely connected in nature and effect to the professional code of 
conduct, but tend to be a more concentrated statement of values than a code. An 
oath is also sworn or affirmed, a performed commitment, which gives an oath a 
greater moral weight.134 The most famous oath is that of doctors in which they 
promise to ‘serve humanity with the utmost respect for human life, even under 
threat’. 135  Lawyers promise to do likewise through the true and honest 
                                                 
132  ResPublica aims to develop bold solutions to enduring social and political problems ‘which prioritise the 
need to recover the language and practice of the common good’: Llewellyn, Steare and Trevellick, above 
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I swear to fulfil, to the best of my ability and judgement, this covenant:  
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This oath I make freely, and upon my honour. 
133  See The Banking and Finance Oath, The Oath (2015) <http://www.thebfo.org/The-Oath/Mission-and-
objectives>: 
Trust is the foundation of my profession 
I will serve all interests in good faith 
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I will pursue my ends with ethical restraint 
I will help create a sustainable future 
I will help create a more just society 
I will speak out against wrongdoing and support others who do the same 
I will accept responsibility for my actions 
My word is my bond. 
134  Daniel P Sulmasy, ‘What Is an Oath and Why Should a Physician Swear One?’ (1999) 20 Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics 329, 329; Boatright, above n 2. 
135  See, eg, the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Geneva, a modern version of the Hippocratic 
Oath, which the Australian Medical Association adopted in 2006: Australian Medical Association, ‘AMA 
Adopts WMA Declaration of Geneva’ (Press Release, 28 September 2006) <https://ama.com.au/media/ 
ama-adopts-wma-declaration-geneva>. 
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administration of justice and the rule of law.136 Engineers too promise to hold 
paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public. 137  The professional 
ceremonial oath or affirmation is sworn in public before their peers by newly 
minted members upon entry to the profession. This aspect of the professional 
promise may be pursued in professional activities outside a practitioner’s 
immediate service to patients or clients, such as in promoting improvements to 
public health or in law reform or as an engineer working for a more sustainable 
use of energy. But a professional might also discharge this public interest duty in 
a quotidian way, by true and honest practice of their profession in the light of its 
values as an institution, to the best of their knowledge, skill and ability. As 
Twining has argued, good ‘down to earth’ technical lawyers who serve their 
clients faithfully and skilfully also promote and preserve the socially important 
institutions of the administration of justice and the rule of law. Lawyers (and 
other professionals) as ‘plumbers’ can give valuable service to the public interest 
even though they might not be in the limelight like the lawyer-statesman 
‘Pericles’.138 
There are a number of aspects in which the oaths, introduced above, depart 
from the promises of a traditional professional. There is in the Dutch oath an 
acknowledgement that a banker will ‘know [their] responsibility towards society’ 
and in the ResPublica oath an affirmation that ‘I will remember that I remain a 
member of society with special obligations to the financial security and 
wellbeing of my customers, their families and the communities they reside in’.139 
The Australian Banking and Finance Oath requires the swearer to promise: ‘I will 
help create a sustainable future; I will help create a more just society’ and the 
associated guidance suggests that ‘justice’ means essentially ‘fairness’.140 While 
these aspirations are well intended they are both too broad and too narrow. They 
are too broad because they do not specify what the banking and finance 
institution is and what it can actually do for the greater good, although this is a 
criticism which can also be made of some professional oaths including law. 
Rather they opt for grand commitments such as to ‘create a more just society’141 
or that ‘I will remember that I remain a member of society with special 
                                                 
136  See, eg, the oath of the lawyer entering practice in NSW: 
I, (name) of (address) do swear that … I will truly and honestly conduct myself in the practice of a legal 
practitioner of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and I shall faithfully serve as such in the 
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 Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) sch F Form 70AA. 
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139  Llewellyn, Steare and Trevellick, above n 97, 14. 
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141  Ibid. 
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obligations’. 142  They are also indefinite because, with the exception of the 
Australian oath, they are not expressed in the language of a commitment to 
positive personal action. 
These oaths are at the same time too narrow and self-serving because, when 
they do express their purpose and commitment to a version of the public good, it 
is subject to the primacy of client obligation143  or sometimes to the banking 
enterprise itself. The latter is true of the ResPublica promise to engage in the 
‘responsible creation of value’. All three oaths make the duty to the customer 
paramount and the Dutch one also provides: ‘I will make every effort to retain 
and improve trust in the financial sector’. In effect, this formulation swears 
allegiance not to the public interest or public financial welfare, but to the 
financial–economic concept of ‘confidence’ which is the (hoped for) product of 
‘trust’ and part of the ‘financial sector’ itself. This injects a goal, without 
identifying for whom ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ is to be enhanced, why and at what 
cost. Was something like ‘confident and informed participation of investors and 
consumers’144 intended? Or is it ‘business confidence’ in the sense of market 
buoyancy or ‘irrational exuberance’ that is meant? Does it signify ‘market 
confidence’ in the sense of an absence of fraud, insider activity or market 
manipulation? However, not all of these types of ‘confidence’ are something to 
‘preserve and enhance’: ‘irrational exuberance’ can be dangerous to the financial 
system.145 
Moreover, if ‘market confidence’ means simply the absence of fraud or other 
illegality, then the Dutch oath adds very little beyond ritual and symbolics,146 for 
obeying the law is the baseline requirement of all citizens, not the higher duty of 
professionals. By turning a market objective into a supposed professional ideal, 
the Dutch oath loses sight of the purpose of professional duties being to confer a 
humanistic good. It should be pointed out that these criticisms that oaths are 
primarily for the benefit of the professional group itself have been made of 
traditional professional oaths.147 
Next, all these are oaths made by professionals personally: ‘a commitment  
to be a certain kind of person for other persons’. 148  They are not made by 
professional entities or firms, though Dutch banks are required to ensure that all 
their employees swear or affirm the Dutch oath. The individual quality is a core 
part of professional integrity and collegiality, since the oath marks out who is 
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part of the community on a broader scale than employment in an entity or sector. 
In this way, professions have given an unequivocal answer to the question often 
raised in regulatory literature as to whether it is more effective to regulate 
through an individual or firm obligation: 149  professions impose obligations  
on individuals. However, as other articles in this Issue demonstrate, 150  the 
professional firm is increasingly the central site for developing and maintaining 
professional identity and practice, and so their commitment to the wider public 
interest is vital too. 
 
B   Codes of Conduct 
One of the difficulties of professionalising banking discussed by the UK 
Parliamentary Banking Inquiry is that of forging shared purpose and identity due 
to the absence of core knowledge, education and training. A related difficulty 
also discussed by the Inquiry is in developing a common banking code of 
practice and ethics as another spur towards shared identity and 
professionalisation. In Britain, there are many codes of conduct in banking and 
finance, however they are mainly adopted by banking and finance firms 
themselves, not by groups of professional individuals and certainly not across the 
sector.151 They have not been effective.152 In the evidence to the Inquiry, there 
was virtual unanimity that there should be a ‘unified professional body, which 
reflected a higher set of standards and expectations for individual behavior than 
those required by the regulator’.153 
In Australia there is a Code of Banking Practice, but it is adopted and 
promoted by banking entities and through their representative industry body, the 
Australian Bankers Association.154 It is not a professionals’ code applying to 
individuals. It is on the principles in such a code that the training for ethical and 
other competencies rest in established professions. It is code principles and 
derivative rules and guidance that are the point of departure for a professional 
association’s investigative and disciplinary activities – the regulatory work that is 
the sharp end of any professional association’s regulative bargain. In Australia as 
in Britain, there are many codes at entity level; in sub-groups across the financial 
sector, aspiring professional groups such as the Financial Planning Association 
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Association of Australia, none have a developed investigation and enforcement capacity. Tellingly, none 
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to assert enough coverage to make a ‘regulative bargain’ for professional governance credible.  
2017 Thematic: Banking and the Limits of Professionalism 437
have also adopted them to govern individual members. 155  A frank overall 
assessment of Australian arrangements is very like the position in Britain: in 
banking, this aspect of professional identity and supporting professional 
association is weak. It is noticeably weak in relation to enforcement, as we 
discuss in Part VI below. 
Drawing conclusions from what we have laid out in this Part, in the 
professional rules, certainly for lawyers, this duty to the professional institutions 
(eg, the administration of justice) and the public interest is made paramount, 
trumping any other duty where there is a conflict with it. It should be noted again 
that some critics say that the two elements of this paramount duty are in conflict. 
The first, the commitment to the institution, is alleged to exert a more 
conservative presence over the second,156 while the second might underplay the 
value of institutional stability in the first. Notwithstanding, this professional duty 
is compulsory and directory, and the hierarchy of duties is fixed: first to the 
public interest, second to other fundamental duties: the client, professional peers 
and the profession’s own reputation. It is a constitutive obligation157 intended as 
the foundation of a collectively created good. These duties may be expressed 
without exception or permitting weighing or postponement. Like the medical 
oath that we have already mentioned, a traditional professional oath is a vow to 
discharge the duties ‘even under threat’: it is ‘unconditional … [and] generally 
binding despite changes in circumstances or the conditions under which they are 
sworn’.158 Sometimes a connected Code of Conduct will provide exceptions to an 
oath or allow prioritisation, judgment and discretion,159 which can be settled in 
individual cases to avoid offending, and to promote, the spirit behind oath 
obligations.160 
By contrast, the different and more lenient quality of the bankers’ oaths all 
take a ‘stakeholder’ approach to ethical priority and the competing interests of 
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with the loyalty to clients required of a profession. It is too early to say whether these changes made over 
the last decade have resulted in the recognition of financial planners as a profession. See, eg, Deen 
Sanders, Professional Enlightenment of Financial Planning in Australia (PhD Thesis, Central 
Queensland University, 2010), which argues that the financial planning industry may not yet be ready to 
be considered a profession. 
156  See Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 
2014) 38. 
157  As opposed to a negative prohibition, as is the case with much statutory regulation. 
158  Boatright, above n 2, 145 (emphasis removed). 
159  The authors are grateful to Dr Hugh Breakey for making these points and those in the two succeeding 
footnotes: Memo from Hugh Breakey to Dimity Kingsford Smith, Thomas Clarke and Justine Rogers, 22 
August 2016. See also Patricia Greenspan, ‘Making Room for Options: Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, 
and Choice’ (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 181; Violetta Igneski, ‘Perfect and Imperfect Duties 
to Aid’ (2006) 32 Social Theory and Practice 439; Daniel Statman, ‘Who Needs Imperfect Duties?’ 
(1996) 33 American Philosophical Quarterly 211. 
160  These exceptions and discretions help oaths and codes to keep their purposes clear, transparent and 
detached from the needs of those subject to them, and arrive at counter-intuitive outcomes when applied 
to unusual cases. See also Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford University Press, 1997) ch 6, which 
argues for multiple levels and forms of rule-making, including principles, rules and approaches to 
mitigate creative compliance, to preserve both purpose and certainty. 
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those who might be served by bankers.161 A stakeholder approach permits the 
weighing and balancing of interests, potentially the elevation of one or more, and 
the discounting or complete disregard of others.162 Stakeholder approaches are 
familiar as the foundation for corporate social responsibility or ‘social licence to 
operate’ arguments for ethical corporate engagement with society and are clearly 
distinct from professionalism: they usually operate at the entity, not individual, 
level. Stakeholder approaches are valuable in widening the range of groups, 
harms and interests considered and providing flexibility. Indeed, the stakeholder 
approach and related business ethics models are being used in professional 
education because of these valuable qualities – even if there remains a problem 
with how to weigh and prioritise these. This is just one example of overlap or 
convergence between some status professions and banking and finance. There is 
something of a ‘two-way traffic’ in professions learning from other occupations 
as well, as they adapt to changing practice conditions and find new ways of 
enacting their values and standards.163 
However, the stakeholder model’s scope for recognising illicit or peripheral 
interests may distract from relevant or substantial ones. For example, a 
stakeholder approach would potentially allow an oath-taker to justify preferring 
the interests of a ‘bully client’ to the public interest or preferring their own bank 
employer to a client. 164  A public-regarding professional duty makes it more 
difficult to justify ‘internal decisions, unrelated to the objective needs of the 
wider world’165 or ‘decisions and behaviour that advance [a bank’s] own narrow 
ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves’.166 A professional 
who can ‘serve all interests in good faith’, as the Australian oath permits, may 
still put client interests before public ones. In the bankers’ oaths, the only limits 
on this weighing approach seem to be that the oath-taker must not mislead or 
deceive any of those whose interests are at stake.167 This is not an emblem of 
professionalism; it is a common-place legal requirement of commerce. Moreover, 
in the context where total commitment of individual bankers to the banking entity 
                                                 
161  See, eg, The Banking and Finance Oath, above n 133: ‘I will serve all interests in good faith’. 
162  Stakeholder approaches to oaths employ a consequentialist or utilitarian ethic, rather than the 
deontological ethic. The latter adopts universal norms which are perfect duties (that is, which always 
apply); though as we have observed, there may be exceptions on a case-by-case basis to avoid counter-
intuitive outcomes. 
163  See Parker and Evans, above n 161, 16–21 and their three-step model of ethical decision-making and 
behaviour that integrates both stakeholder and code approaches. Lawyers are also beginning to use the 
knowledge of business ethics educators and regulators on ethical decision-making and biases. They are 
teaching how ethical decision-making and behaviour occurs and how to address such decisions with 
others. This is a valuable way to internalise confidence to raise ethical matters, rather than simply 
teaching and relying on knowledge of the rules. 
164  For example, the Banking and Finance Oath does not restrict the oath-taker from prioritising their 
employer’s or shareholders’ interests ahead of the public interest: see The Banking and Finance Oath, 
above n 133, [2]. In the case of a traditional profession, the public interest is first, the legitimate client 
interest second and the employer interest thereafter. 
165  Llewellyn, Steare and Trevellick, above n 97, 8. 
166  Ibid 14, quoting the Harvard Master of Business Administration oath. 
167  The guidance to the promise ‘I will serve all interests in good faith’ permits the swearer to weigh and 
prioritise interests, and in so doing, to put the employer bank first: The Banking and Finance Oath, above 
n 133. 
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itself has overwhelmed public interests, one very telling distinction between 
professional obligations and stakeholder ethics is that the latter are generally 
voluntary and instrumental, while professional ethics generally are not. Such 
differences between the stakeholder approach and professional logic are 
important in considering whether banking has the potential to professionalise. 
 
IV   DUTY TO THE CLIENT 
Adam Smith’s observation some 240 years ago that we ‘trust our health to 
the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer 
and attorney’ remains grounded in their fidelity and judgment.168 Professional 
knowledge is, or should be,169 developed and delivered primarily for the benefit 
of clients, in support of social institutions that are vitally important, such as 
public health, the administration of justice and the core concern of engineering, 
the physical safety of the public. 
 
A   Professionalism and Duties of Loyalty and Confidence 
In many relationships in banking (recollecting that we use this term to 
include finance) but not all, as discussed below, the law protects the relationship 
of banker and customer by the application of the fiduciary duty. The importance 
of this to the question of professionalism is that in some areas of banking, there 
are already requirements which serve to cement a higher standard of duty to the 
customer or client than those of ordinary commerce. There is clear authority that 
trustees,170 investment managers,171 stockbrokers172 and financial advisers173 may 
owe fiduciary duties. Whether corporate financial advisers are fiduciaries is even 
more context dependent and reliant on the terms of the advice mandate.174 It is 
also accepted that the debtor and creditor relation common to most banking is  
not fiduciary,175 and likewise over-the-counter (‘OTC’, or principal-to-principal) 
transactions with clients and banks’ proprietary trading activities. These 
observations lead to a further one: that some parts of banking may be better 
candidates for professionalism than others, at least in principle. As we elaborate 
                                                 
168  Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Oxford University Press, first published 1776, 1998 ed) 82. 
169  The professions have, however, also been criticised as being self-serving by controlling a monopoly on 
their market and status: see, eg, Rogers, Kingsford Smith and Chellew, above n 21; Magali Sarfatti 
Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: Monopolies of Competence and Sheltered Markets (Transaction 
Publishers, 2013). 
170  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 (Gibbs CJ).  
171  Investment managers are often trustees, and when they are not will often be agents and fiduciaries: see 
SPL Private Finance (PF1) IC Ltd v Arch Financial Products LLP [2014] EWHC 4268 (Comm). 
172  Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371, 377 (Gibbs CJ), 385 (Brennan J).  
173 ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1, [1063]–[1072] (The Court); 
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 7 BFRA 1, [733] (Rares J). 
174  ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) (2007) 160 FCR 35, [266] (Jacobson J); 
Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 478. 
175  Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371, 384–385 (Brennan J). 
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below, these areas tend to be where advising is central to the customer or client 
relationship. This is in contrast to the trading of financial instruments or the 
making of credit contracts, which are the financial functions of large parts of the 
banking sector, and acknowledged as its riskiest and most profitable ones. 
Like the oaths and affirmations we have discussed above, fiduciary duties are 
mandatory. They can only be relaxed with the fully informed consent of  
the beneficiary of the duty.176 Because of failures in obtaining this consent in 
consumer financial markets, there are now statutory limits in retail advising on 
when and whether a beneficiary of a fiduciary duty can agree or contract to waive 
their protection.177 While fiduciaries have many duties, only some are peculiar to 
the fiduciary relationship.178 Those that are particular to the fiduciary are often 
described as those that ‘comprise that notion of loyalty’.179 The first duty central 
to fiduciary loyalty ‘prohibits a fiduciary from acting in a situation in which there 
is a conflict between the duty he owes to his principal and his personal 
interest’.180 The second ‘prohibits a fiduciary from receiving any unauthorised 
profit as a result of his fiduciary position’. These conflict duties are the 
‘irreducible core of the fiduciary obligation’.181 
Some argue that, as well as the two arms of the loyalty duty, there is  
another duty in equity which requires a fiduciary to act ‘in the best interests’ of 
the beneficiary client.182 While this duty has a relatively clear provenance and 
content in trust law, it is far less settled in its application to other advisory or 
fiduciary contexts in banking.183 Some reject its application here entirely.184 This 
uncertainty has recently been addressed by the adoption of a statutory ‘best 
interests’ duty applying to financial advising.185  
                                                 
176  Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Fiduciary Obligations, Financial Advisers and FOFA’ (2014) 32 
Company and Securities Law Journal 527, 534–7; Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers 
Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 7 BFRA 1, [746] (Rares J). 
177  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 960A. 
178  For example, fiduciaries have a duty of care to their beneficiaries but this is not a duty of a fiduciary 
quality: ‘not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty’: Bristol and West Building 
Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 16 (Millett LJ). 
179  Above n 176. 
180  Ibid 39. This duty now has a statutory analogue in retail financial advising prohibiting commissions and 
other forms of conflicted financial remuneration; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A, div 4, sub-divs 
A–C. 
181  Ernest J Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, 16. 
182  Geraint W Thomas, ‘The Duty of Trustees to Act in the “Best Interests” of Their Beneficiaries’ (2008) 2 
Journal of Equity 177, 178–9. 
183  Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750; Sir Robert Megarry, ‘Investing Pension Funds: The Mineworkers 
Case’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Law Book, 1989) 149, 152–3. The discussion 
about the nature and extent of fiduciary duties continues: see Sarah Worthington, ‘Fiduciaries: Following 
Finn’ in Tim Bonyhady (ed), Finn’s Law: An Australian Justice (Federation Press, 2016) 33; Paul Finn, 
‘Fiduciary Reflections’ (2014) 88 Australian Law Journal 127, 127–8; Paul Finn, Fiduciary Obligations: 
40th Anniversary Republication with Additional Essays (Federation Press, 2016); Paul Finn, ‘Contract and 
the Fiduciary Principle’ (1989) 12 University of New South Wales Law Journal 76.  
184  Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 113 [40] (Gaudron and McHugh JJ).  
185  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A, div 2; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Regulatory Guide No 175: Licensing: Financial Product Advisers – Conduct and Disclosure (at 3 
October 2013).  
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While duties of confidence are often referred to in the same breath as 
fiduciary duties, they are not exclusive to the fiduciary relationship, though 
overlapping. Conaglen argues that ‘the prevailing view is that the foundation of 
the doctrine of confidence no longer rests in the protection of property’,186 but is 
better considered as derived from ‘the obligation of conscience arising from the 
circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or 
obtained’. 187  Whatever its foundation or nature, the practical reality in most 
contexts is that the banker has received information for the purposes of the 
relationship and is bound to keep it confidential. This is also generally considered 
a feature of professional relationships. In banking (in our extended sense) it is 
clear that some relationships are fiduciary and virtually all attract, or are treated 
as attracting, a duty of confidence; our central question is whether these 
relationships also could be professional.188 
 
B   Professionalism and Client Vulnerability 
The professional responsibility to care for clients is often explained, in 
economic analyses, as arising from an asymmetry of knowledge between the two. 
But even where the client is knowledgeable, professional relations are profoundly 
interpersonal, as Sulmasy, Boatright and Breakey each point out.189 Speaking of 
the medical profession, Pellegrino puts it in more expressly ethical terms: that it 
is the radical vulnerability of the patient in their illness with diminished agency190 
and ‘no recourse but trust’ 191  that morally demands a reciprocal professional  
duty which vindicates the patient’s trust. ‘[It] is a special moral claim with a  
special moral commitment’.192 Signified and enacted by the professional oath, the 
professional makes ‘a commitment to be a certain kind of person for other 
persons’. 193  The professional ‘who swears an oath not only puts his or her 
personhood on the line, he or she does so for the sake of a connection’ to those 
for whom the oath is taken: in the case of a professional, this includes (but as  
we have discussed is not limited to) their clients.194  The law recognises this 
vulnerability and the client’s forced dependence on trust in advisory relationships 
such as advisor, broker, trustee, and investment manager. It enforces the moral 
commitment of the professional to serve the vulnerability of the client through 
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and the duty of confidence. 
                                                 
186  Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart 
Publishing, 2010) 242. 
187  Moorgate Tobacco v Phillip Morris [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438 (Deane J), quoted in Breen v 
Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 81 (Brennan CJ). 
188  Not all professional relationships, however, are fiduciary: see, eg, Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 
regarding the relationship between the doctor and patient. 
189  Sulmasy, above n 134, 332–4; Boatright, above n 2; Breakey, above n 28. 
190  Edmund D Pellegrino, ‘Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of the Act of 
Profession and the Fact of Illness’ (1979) 4 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32. 
191  Sulmasy, above n 134, 341. 
192  Ibid. 
193  Ibid 333. 
194  Ibid 334. 
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The vulnerability of ordinary bank and financial services customers, 
particularly in relation to investing decisions, is well documented,195 but perhaps 
under-recognised in the professions’ debates. As with medical, legal, or 
engineering expertise, the financial knowledge and capability of most individuals 
is low.196 Meanwhile, over the last generation, significant financial responsibility 
has been devolved to individuals.197 Financial decision-making has become both 
more complex and more necessary with the increasing ‘financialisation’ of 
everyday life.198 The autonomy of an individual is diminished if they cannot 
access financial resources and their life chances and welfare may be reduced. In 
some tragic cases, significant financial loss or financial exclusion literally 
becomes a matter of life and death. Individuals are vulnerable to the quality of 
interaction with the financial system and, as in the medical context, the majority 
have ‘no recourse but trust’.199 
 
C   Shared Expertise and Training and Competence 
One of the ways in which the quality and advancement of the expert 
knowledge of a professional is assured and the fiduciary duty fostered is through 
systematic training and qualification for professional formation and continuing 
education.200 Many non-professional occupations and emerging professions also 
have systematic education requirements, some quite significant, though not 
usually as high as the professions.201 
By contrast, training for work in banking is fragmented and there are no 
universally recognised core subjects and no universal standards or qualification. 
Likewise, there is no general requirement for continuing education. Though 
continuing training occurs on the variety and complexity of trends and products 
in finance it is as variable and split up as the sector itself.202 In practice, bankers 
usually do have a university degree and allied practical training, whether or not 
this is required. However, there is no agreed qualification that makes those in 
banking and finance into a ‘banker’,203 and some doubt whether this is even 
possible. 204  Hall and Appleyard provide evidence that the most intense and 
formative training occurs with new recruits in banking, providing identity with 
the firm, 205  rather than a wider professional group. The UK Parliamentary 
                                                 
195  See the discussion of the ‘behaviouralist’ and financial literacy aspects of this in Dimity Kingsford Smith 
and Olivia Dixon, ‘The Consumer Interest and the Financial Markets’ in Niamh Maloney, Eilís Ferran 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
695. 
196  Ibid. 
197  Ibid. 
198  Ibid. 
199  Sulmasy, above n 134, 341. 
200  Andrew Boon and Jennifer Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 77. 
201  See discussion of new education requirements for Financial Planning Association members below in text 
accompanying nn 208–209. 
202  Hall and Appleyard, above n 33. 
203  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 295. 
204  Ibid 296–7. 
205  Hall and Appleyard, above n 33. 
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Banking Inquiry concluded: ‘“Banking” involves a wide range of activities and 
lacks a large common core of learning which is a feature of most professions’.206 
The Inquiry deplored the fact that many banks have senior executives and 
directors with little or no qualification for the work they do.207 
Although banking might lack a ‘common core of learning’, there are some 
areas of deliberate and self-conscious improvement where standards and 
processes are being developed, and most importantly the politics of change are 
practiced, which might provide a wider template for the sector. In its attempts 
over the last 15 years to professionalise, the Financial Planning Association of 
Australia (‘FPA’) recognised the extreme modesty of current education and 
training requirements of its members and has taken steps to address this. The 
FPA promotes a Certified Financial Planner (‘CFP’) membership. Almost half of 
its 12 000 members now hold this certification, which represents a significant 
proportion of the financial advice sector.208 The CFP requirements are modelled 
on those required for other professions. A CFP must hold a university degree, 
have at least three years of relevant industry experience and complete five CFP-
specific training courses, each of a few months in duration.209  By increasing 
requirements beyond low government regulatory requirements210 towards those of 
the established professions, financial advisers have developed common structures 
for competence on entry, maintaining currency of expertise and strengthening 
identity.  
Overall, this picture of banking training and competence shows pathways 
towards qualification at variable levels of development. Ideally these paths would 
assure high quality, ethical knowledge and skills, comparable to established 
professions with more specialised knowledge and training at earlier stages, and 
greater harmonisation. In the meantime, to the UK Parliamentary Banking 
Inquiry, the absences in commonality of education and training were strong 
evidence supporting their conclusion that banking is not professionalised. The 
Inquiry also concluded that from the expertise and education perspective, 
banking is not ready to be a profession.211 
 
D   Professionalism and the Giving of Advice 
As well as their expertise, the fiduciary quality of trust we discussed above is 
also seen in the expectation that the professional will use their judgment to advise 
on the client’s particular circumstances. To do this, the client must be able to 
confide in the professional and reveal confidential information as the parallel and 
overlapping duty of confidence permits. So armed, the professional is expected to 
                                                 
206  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 306. 
207  Ibid 308–9. 
208  Financial Planning Association of Australia, Membership <http://fpa.com.au/membership/>. 
209  Financial Planning Association of Australia, About the CFP Program <http://fpa.asn.au/cfp/cfp-
certification-program/>. 
210  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide No 146: Licensing: Training 
of Financial Product Advisers (at July 2012). This low standard is likely to be raised by the recent 
passing of the Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth).  
211  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 308.  
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employ their expertise and judgment to respond to the particular needs of the 
client and provide appropriate tailored or bespoke advice using discretionary 
judgement,212 not general advice. In banking, much of the sector does not give 
advice, or does so only incidentally and not in a fiduciary capacity. Instead, 
banking institutions often and increasingly buy and sell financial contracts 
between themselves and to their clients as counterparties. They do so while 
providing objective information about price and execution, not giving personal 
advice. Instead, much banking activity involves commercial trading and 
contracting.213 
In a wider discussion of bank culture, the President and CEO of the New 
York Federal Reserve noted the further shift towards transactional, arm’s length 
relationships and their impact on ethics: 
Another important element affecting culture has been the shift in the prevailing 
business model away from traditional commercial and investment banking 
activities to trading; that is, from client-oriented to transaction-oriented activities. 
Clients became counterparties – the other side of a trade – rather than partners in a 
long-term business relationship. In general, interactions became more 
depersonalized, making it easier to rationalize away bad behavior, and more 
difficult to identify who would be harmed by any unethical actions.214 
These insights of financial insiders, that banks transact with clients as much 
as they provide advisory services for them, reveal another potential lack of 
fitness of the financial sector for professionalism. Investment banks, or 
investment banking divisions within conglomerate full-service banks, for 
instance, earn much of their revenue from proprietary trading. Proprietary trading 
occurs when the bank uses its own funds to trade against the market in financial 
products for its own account (ideally profitably), not that of its clients. While 
under the post-GFC structural reforms there have been regulatory curbs on 
proprietary trading by commercial banks (described in Part II), 215  proprietary 
trading continues to grow as a source of revenue for investment banks 
By contrast with proprietary trading, where the counterparty is not a 
customer, in the OTC markets the bank may enter into a contract directly with 
the client as counterparty. That is, the bank may seek to profit on the contract 
with the client by taking an opposing position. In doing so, the bank may depart 
from the standardised terms governing OTC transactions and negotiate special or 
bespoke terms as to lot size or settlement, against its ‘client’ counterparty. A 
bank having a client as counterparty on a contract with a view to speculative 
profit is very common in derivatives trading and extends to other financial 
products. 
There are, of course, banking activities that are closer to the professional 
advisory relationship, for example share broking transactions (most banks have a 
broking arm). Here, the bank may provide advice on share selection and then 
execute the buy or sell order on the customer’s behalf. It earns a fee or 
                                                 
212  Australian Securities Commission v Cassimatis [No 8] (2016) 336 ALR 209, 326 [609] (Edelman J). 
213  Ibid 295. 
214  Dudley, above n 88. 
215  See, eg, Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5301–5641 (2012), referred to as the Volcker Rule. 
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commission from providing the advice and acting as an agent for the client to 
access the exchange, not a profit on the transaction. In this kind of service 
provision, like the other advisory services we discuss below, the relationship of 
broker to customer is clearly both advisory and fiduciary. Traditionally it has also 
been personal, though this is changing with self-directed non-advisory online 
investing. Between the contrasts of what we have called the transactional 
approach and advisory services lies myriad other interactions between bank and 
customer. 
An important example to show how a direct, seemingly personal client 
relationship can be neither fiduciary, nor even truly advisory, is the extension of 
credit to customers. The extension of credit may be through a credit card or car 
loan, home loan, business loan or, as was previously offered by merchant banks, 
a trade credit facility. These days, many of these loans do not require even 
meeting with a banker and can be obtained over the internet without advice. Even 
when loans are provided through personal meetings, most are so standardised that 
whether they are offered depends exclusively on the financial capacity to repay 
and/or availability of security.216 Financial information may be offered by the 
banker, but advice requiring expert knowledge and judgment in relation to a loan 
is rare. This is also true of simple financial products offered by banks, such as 
savings and term deposits.217 The role of the bank teller or loan officer is to 
describe the terms of the products and identify for the customer the loan 
packages that the bank would be prepared to offer them. While there is a bank 
and customer relationship here, its personal quality is attenuated by the 
standardised nature of the loan contracts and their manner of distribution, 
especially online. The relationship is contractual and not fiduciary, though 
bankers do have a duty of confidence in relation to the customer’s financial 
information. The picture is similar even in relation to high net worth personal 
customers and small to medium businesses. 
Closer to the advice end of the spectrum, investment bankers provide advice 
to large corporations and governments on raising capital and on mergers, 
acquisitions, restructuring and privatisation transactions. The bank will then 
usually direct the implementation of the transactions they have recommended, 
taking a fee for advice, a success fee or a mixture of both. Banks also have 
investment management arms. Under an investment mandate, they generally 
exercise discretionary powers to invest on behalf of a client with large pools of 
assets, often for retirement income. Banks also usually have retail financial 
planning or advising businesses, offering advice for the practical purpose of 
building and protecting personal and household wealth. Unless excluded by 
                                                 
216  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 308 refers to this process of assessment as ‘credit scoring’. 
See generally Evzen Kocenda and Martin Vojtek ‘Default Predictors and Credit Scoring Models for 
Retail Banking’ (Working Paper No 2862, CESifo, December 2009). 
217  See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘CA’); Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) (‘CR’), which allow basic 
banking products such as savings and term deposits to be sold without a wide range of protections, 
including disclosure documents (CA ss 941C, 946AA; CR regs 7.7.09A, 7.9.07FA), the requirement to 
put the client first (CA ss 961(1), 961J(2)), and the full obligation to act in the client’s best interests (CA 
ss 961(1), 961B(3)–(5); CR reg 7.7A.05). This is so if only financial information is given or only general 
advice is given or if personal advice is given for an amount under $15,000. 
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contract, the advisory relationship in all of corporate and retail financial advising, 
stockbroking and investment management is fiduciary, though as we have 
already observed, because other elements such as a public purpose or common 
education are missing, not necessarily professional. 
 
V   DUTY TO PEERS AND PROFESSION 
Reverting once again to the earlier articles in this Issue, the reader will have 
observed that an important duty of a professional is to his or her peers, and wider 
professional group. Often, this norm finds expression in codes of ethics as a 
requirement to act with respect, civility and without misleading peer 
professionals with whom one is dealing. More broadly, professionals must act in 
a way that does not bring the profession into disrepute. It is hoped that these 
duties are fostered by peer mentoring as well as the mechanisms outlined above, 
common knowledge and training, and the rituals of shared professional purpose 
and identity: a self-awareness that finds further solidarity in membership of a 
professional association, as we soon consider. 
It is worth also pointing out that the state’s role in offering some degree of 
protection from ultra-competitive commercial concerns is seen as a valid means 
of incentivising and supporting professional independence and responsibility. 
Professional peer civility allows professionals to get on with being professional, 
that is, with collegiality and altruism, things they cannot do if concerned with 
acquiring and maintaining authority and status.218 
Peer relations in banking, by contrast, are characterised by intense 
competition, 219  and not shared purpose, peer respect or jealous guarding of 
common reputation. However, and encouragingly, there are some efforts among 
this sector to inculcate collegiality and more collegiate relationships. One of the 
strengths of the Australian Banking and Finance Oath organisation, reviewed 
above, is the community of like-minded people it connects who prioritise ethical 
behaviour. The organisation provides opportunities for learning, discussion, 
scenario analysis, and seeking the support of other signatories. 220  Possibly 
replicating the professional mentorship model, it concentrates on recruiting 
senior and experienced bankers and on hosting events and discussions to educate 
its oath-takers. This seems to us to be a start in supplying the platform for the 
wider norms of professional ethos (public purpose and clients) to flourish, as well 
as developing the ethos and routines for professional association with peers. 
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competition is at both an institutional and individual level. 
220  The Banking and Finance Oath, Programs (2015) <http://www.thebfo.org/Programs>. 
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VI   PROFESSIONAL SELF-GOVERNANCE IN BANKING AND 
FINANCE 
Professionalising requires a professional association, which as indicated in 
earlier articles, enjoys more or less a monopoly of control over the myriad 
activities that are enablers and preservers of professions and their social promise. 
It is through professional associations that the political project of the regulative 
bargain with the state is implicitly concluded. Under this ‘bargain’, professional 
self-governance is exchanged for the guarantee of self-denying service by 
professionals in the public interest and expert advice to clients. In the case of 
banking and finance, the possibilities of professional self-governance are 
seriously curtailed by: firstly, the low levels of association membership; 
secondly, by the century-long presence of state legislated regulatory regimes 
reflecting the central importance of banking entities to modern economies; and 
thirdly, the further regulation in banking and finance since the GFC and LIBOR 
scandals, motivated by public and political mistrust and the austerity endured by 
financial consumers and taxpayers alike because of financial failures (either 
rescued or realised). The latter was discussed in Part II above. In this Part, we 
examine the practical and political possibilities for a contribution to the 
regulation of banking and finance through professional self-governance, given 
the sector’s desire for it. 
It is not easy to imagine the circumstances, either practical or political, in 
which the state would agree to a regulative bargain to give up the compulsory 
powers of regulation and enforcement over the personnel of banks and financial 
institutions, let alone the entities themselves. It is arguable that a different sort of 
regulative bargain has already been struck with the sector: the exchange of 
limited liability and public subsidies enjoyed by banks (for example, central bank 
lending facilities and deposit guarantee schemes) for the regulation which is 
ubiquitous in the sector. The attempts by the British banking industry to persuade 
the UK Parliamentary Banking Inquiry that the industry could feasibly and 
credibly self-regulate as a profession were mostly dismissed as an indefensible 
power-grab. Indeed, from the analysis we have already given, the reader will 
likely have concluded that institutionalising the professionalism of individual 
conduct in the sector has immense obstacles to overcome. However, we advocate 
greater ethical self-consciousness in banking as suggested by the adoption of 
oaths and codes, ethical and technical education, and the identification and 
adoption of a public interest that banking supports – in short, that 
professionalisation still has contributions to make and that it should make, and a 
professional association is central. 
To be successful in self-governance, the professional association needs to 
have the vast majority, if not virtually all the individuals practicing, as members. 
Otherwise, its standard-setting, training, collegiality-building and representation 
have insufficient grip to establish legitimacy and authority – both internally to the 
profession itself and externally. Unfortunately, professional association  
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amongst bankers is weak.221 In Australia the Australian Bankers Association is an 
industry representative body comprised of banking entities and does not have 
individual membership.222 Otherwise there is the Australian Investment Bankers 
Association, 223  which limits its membership to corporate advisers. There are 
many other sub-sectoral associations such as the FPA discussed above, which 
reflect sector fragmentation and, with some exceptions, professional ethos within 
them is not well developed. In Britain, while there are professional banking 
associations, their membership has declined to less than 10 per cent of what it 
was 30 years ago.224 Of the 450 000 employees in banking, only a very small 
number (about 30 000) belong to these professional associations.225 Accordingly, 
the sector lacks professional membership of an association that could plausibly 
be a party to a regulative bargain delivering self-governance. 
To make self-governance credible, the professional association needs not 
only to be able to set standards, but to have meaningful disciplinary power over 
its members, especially the power of expulsion. Enforcement of professional 
regulation has always been a weakness even in established professions.226 To start 
with, there is an inherent conflict in a professional association managing both 
representative and regulatory responsibilities. If they remain domestic tribunals 
and power over members derives from a contract of membership, associations 
have limitations on their investigation and disciplinary powers. They have no 
powers of compulsion: surrendering of information or documents and attendance 
at hearings depends almost entirely on cooperation by the person under 
disciplinary consideration.227 Further, where evidence depends on third parties 
and not members of the profession – for example a professional’s corporate 
employer like a bank – there is no power at all to require evidence or other 
cooperation, since they are not contractually bound. Likewise, the enforcement of 
sanctions is limited: a domestic tribunal resting solely on contractual powers has 
no practical ability to collect fines or to compel supervised practice, further 
                                                 
221  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 296. 
222  See Australian Bankers’ Association, Members (December 2016) <http://www.bankers.asn.au/About-
Us/Members>. 
223  Australian Investment Banking Association, About <http://aiba.org.au/about/>. 
224  The Chartered Banker Institute (now IFS School of Finance) and the Chartered Institute of Bankers in 
Scotland: in the 30-year period between the 1980s and 2010, the membership of the former had dropped 
from 150 000 to 22 000 and it was no longer expected that someone aspiring to senior positions in 
banking would be a member or have qualifications offered by the Chartered Banker Institute. See 
Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 295. It was also revealed in evidence by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and HBOS that the Chairmen and Chief Executives of these banks did not have a banking 
qualification between them: at 296. 
225  Ibid 296. 
226  See, eg, Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission to Financial System Inquiry Committee, Financial Systems 
Inquiry, 2014, 19–20; Murray Report, above n 16, 204. See generally Justin O’Brien et al, ‘Professional 
Standards and the Social Licence to Operate: A Panacea for Finance or an Exercise in Symbolism?’ 
(2015) 9 Law and Financial Markets Review 283, 285–7 for critique of the potential for professionalising 
the banking sector and the hesitancy of banking associations such as the British Banking Association to 
enforce standards on members. 
227  JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2010). However, professional membership 
rules typically state that failure to cooperate itself leads to expulsion. The member’s failure to assist is 
taken as a rejection of any desire for reintegration and return to good standing as a professional. 
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education and so on. Admonition alone is likely too lenient and expulsion will 
often be out of proportion with the breach. 
For a variety of reasons which are canvassed in previous articles, even 
established professions no longer enjoy complete self-governance. Since the 
1990s, they have each had to adopt models of either formal co-regulation with 
the state or else have become government regulated, with the professional 
association relegated to an informal, secondary role.228 In these professions, co-
regulation extends to investigation and disciplinary activity, with enforcement 
undertaken by statutory agencies that exist in parallel with professional 
associations. In some instances, the statutory investigation and enforcement 
powers are delegated to and exercised by the professional bodies themselves  
with statutory accountability. 229  In banking and finance, any arrangements to 
invigorate associational enforcement would be further complicated by overlap 
with long-standing statutory regulation of individual conduct by banking and 
financial services regulators. Although public enforcement against individuals 
has its difficulties, and the focus is on entities, there is great reluctance by 
financial regulators to give up powers to a professional body because this 
complexity may add to existing difficulties. 230  In summary, any professional 
association in banking must overcome these obstacles before it could provide a 
focus for professional recognition and regulatory autonomy.  
 
VII   CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONALISM 
We draw our argument to a close by identifying from our discussion the 
limits of professionalism and how banking might adjust to a professional 
framework in future. Put another way, we use our conclusions to consider what 
banking might look like if it were to take professionalism seriously, as well as 
rhetorically. We hope this concluding analysis may also assist other occupational 
groups with aspirations to professionalise. 
 
A   Entity Separation, the Real Economy and the Public Interest 
Demands for more professionalism, including this analysis, are generally 
hopeful about changing the motivations of individuals, so they make better 
decisions and conduct improves. To achieve this and for the reasons we have 
given – risky business, the pursuit of profit, imprudent incentives and the diverse 
mix of fiduciary and non-fiduciary functions in banking with various prospects 
                                                 
228  For example, the law profession is now regulated under a co-regulatory model with, in NSW, the Law 
Society of NSW having a formal co-regulatory role in conjunction with the statutory regulator, the Legal 
Services Commissioner, under the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW). In the area of health, 14 
medical and allied health professions, including doctors, nurses and midwives, radiologists, occupational 
therapists, chiropractors, osteopaths, psychologists and Chinese medicine practitioners, are now all 
regulated in Australia under a National scheme with the various, related professional associations having 
no formal co-regulatory role: see, eg, Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (NSW). 
229  See Rogers, Kingsford Smith and Chellew, above n 21. 
230  Changing Banking for Good vol II, above n 4, 305. 
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for professionalising – we conclude it is very likely that greater professionalism 
will demand greater entity separation. To professionalise banking through 
serving the public interest and/or a socially important institution, as argued in our 
discussion of oaths, it seems inevitable that banks will need to renew their 
attention to the real and retail economies. Likewise, if banking is to serve better 
its fiduciary advisory clients and its customers seeking credit.  
As the post-GFC investigations showed, risky proprietary trading (when it 
goes well) is largely for the profit of the entity. Along with the reasons of 
prudence and institutional resilience that the post-GFC reformers argued, we 
think that separation would make it easier to evolve a public interest ethos 
distinctive to the socially beneficial activities of traditional business, commercial 
and financial consumer banking, undiverted by proprietary trading. As the 
industry voices we quoted in Part II pointed out, simpler entities are easier to 
govern, and we argue that includes governance through professionalism. A 
comparatively singular focus would allow potential bankers to undergo 
professional formation and develop identity with a clear, public purpose, 
buttressed by shared ideals and practical ethical support as part of an (emerging) 
professional group. They could concentrate on products and services beneficial to 
clients and customers, and to the economy and society more widely. Governance 
of a simpler organisation, which clarifies and expects that executive authority 
will support individual ethical decision-making, would legitimate 
professionalism in a setting driven by profit and remuneration. We have pointed 
out the plausibility (and LIBOR showed the reality) of non-professional 
executives accepting (or through remuneration and other practices tacitly 
encouraging) unethical or unlawful conduct. Separation of wholesale and 
proprietary functions from real economy and customer-facing banking has been 
required by regulation for prudential reasons. Our first conclusion is that this 
could be leveraged to encourage fiduciaries and/or professionals (in the making) 
to operate more ethically in the wider public and client interest.  
 
B   Firm Ethos, Professional Ethos and the Importance of Professional 
Association.  
Our second conclusion is that for banking to professionalise firms will need 
to resolve the tension between firm ethos and professional ethos. As the research 
demonstrates the firm is an alternative and even opposing site of identity, 
training, and, most powerful of all, remuneration tied to firm success. Firm 
allegiance has corroded individual membership of professional associations 
where that opportunity exists, and crowded out values other than those of the 
firm.  
More particularly, banking will need to encourage individual membership of 
a professional association if banking is to advance towards a public commitment. 
Banking has shown an awareness of the need for a public commitment, as 
exhibited by the oaths we have reviewed, but how should such an oath be 
formulated? Could an oath and core duty be to advance ‘the economic prosperity 
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and welfare of the public’?231 On analogy with medicine, could bankers promise 
to ‘advance the financial health of the economy and the personal, domestic and 
household financial wellbeing of the members of the public’232 or, mirroring the 
engineers’ oath, to ‘advance the financial safety, the economic prosperity and 
welfare of the public’? Alternatively, should banking ‘provide security and 
prosperity for its customers, and to enable the flourishing of their communities in 
a manner that is responsible’? 233  Finally, the Australian Bankers Association 
identifies a purpose of the type we are discussing. It describes its purpose as 
being ‘to ensure the banking industry is recognised widely as an essential  
and responsible contributor to Australia’s prosperity’.234 Reworded, this could 
become a statement of professional purpose: ‘to serve banking and finance so it 
is an essential and responsible contributor to the prosperity of Australia and the 
members of the public’. However, none of these formulations will make 
professionalism possible if professional association is weakened by firm 
allegiance. It is practically impossible to develop a sector-wide or even sectional 
identity and sense of professional purpose where independent association is weak 
or non-existent. From that association independent of the banking firm flows 
greater possibility of common professional purpose, ethical and educational 
standards, professional mentoring and shared identity. The artifacts such as codes 
of conduct, and routines of professionalism including mentoring and advice 
about how to discharge professional obligations in hard cases, would also 
emanate from the professional association.  
 
C   Coexistence of Government Regulation and Professional Autonomy 
As other articles in this Issue make clear, even established professions now 
exist in a regulated environment.235 Indeed, it is accurate to say that established 
professions are particularly likely to be heavily regulated, given the vital public 
interest in their services. Were banking to professionalise it would not be 
exceptional in having to limit the traditional professional desire for regulative 
autonomy to co-exist with government regulation. So our third conclusion is that 
a banking professional association would need to lead its members to see the 
benefits of co-regulation with the government, given that in a post-GFC world 
the deregulation of banking is politically unlikely. What would this co-regulation 
look like, and what might be its limits?  
As in traditional professions a professional banking association should be an 
important voice in regulatory reform, whether identifying gaps in need of new 
regulation, bringing old regulation up-to-date or in developing associated policy. 
Though working in a regulated environment, an association could bring forward 
many of the benefits of self-regulation: practical and expert knowledge; a 
                                                 
231  See also Reserve Bank of Australia Act 1959 (Cth) s 10(2)(c); Dutch Banking Association, above n 131. 
232  Australian Treasury officers sometimes refer to financial advisers as providing a ‘prescription’ for 
individuals needing a strategy for a return to or for the maintenance of financial good health. 
233  Llewellyn, Steare and Trevellick, above n 97, 8. However, the suggested oath (at 14) does not really 
capture this as the purpose of the promises that the British banker might swear to. 
234  Australian Bankers’ Association, History <http://www.bankers.asn.au/About-Us/History>. 
235  See Rogers, Kingsford Smith and Chellew, above n 21.  
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perspective independent of banks themselves; and most relevantly, a perspective 
informed by the public interest.  
Cotterrell observes that government regulation may be perceived as external 
and illegitimate.236 Applied to banking, it is not difficult to see how the prudential 
and protective purposes of regulation could be seen as lacking legitimacy with 
the regulated group’s occupational and social norms: norms tied to risk, profit-
seeking and high remuneration. As professions have (or should have) a 
constitutive ethos of commitment to the public interest and client purposes, 
common ground with public regulatory objectives properly understood should be 
easier to find than might be the case between professional and firm values. One 
mode of co-regulation is associational leadership so members believe that it is 
right to give priority to others’ interests and in the process improve or even 
exceed what is needed for compliance with ‘outside’ regulation. Such leadership 
to address professional and regulatory commonalities may help professionals be 
less inclined to ‘creative-compliance’ and other resistant conduct. 237  Practical 
examples of this might be found in codes of conduct, where professional 
obligations are required to be discharged at a higher standard than analogous 
legislative ones. Likewise in training professionals in how to conduct ethical 
conversations with employer firms, and sometimes with clients, to justify and 
enact more public-regarding conduct. These are the sorts of difficult 
conversations the Australian Banking and Financial Oath organisation mentors 
for. These initiatives are all the more important when it is realised that in 
banking, as elsewhere, enforcement is in practice ‘spread around thinly and 
weakly’.238 So regulators depend on the internalisation of program purposes by 
the regulated (and professionalised) for the practical realisation of regulatory 
objectives.  
It is, however, reasonable to be sceptical about how much responsibility can 
be placed on individuals to act ethically when professionalism is undeveloped 
and when entity structure and incentivised high remuneration remain inimical, 
executive authority is not professionalised, and professional peer support is 
scarce. This involves finding a balance between pushing down liabilities to 
individuals239 and driving liabilities home to the entities that employ them.240 This 
issue identifies perhaps the most difficult arena for banking co-regulation, the 
enforcement context: this is where the established professions have co-regulated 
most thoroughly but banking may face greater obstacles. As is elaborated in  
this Issue,241 traditional professions have co-regulated by providing disciplinary 
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procedures and personnel to enforce obligations imposed by statute and 
government regulation. The value of this is to bring peer assessments and 
expectations to bear on allegations of unsatisfactory conduct or misconduct.  
In the wake of the GFC and of the LIBOR scandal, banking and finance 
entities have paid record fines to government regulators. Regardless, there has 
been much criticism of the absence of high-profile civil penalty or criminal 
prosecutions of those in authority in the lead up to the GFC,242 though this has 
changed somewhat with the LIBOR scandal. 243  Along with the reforms we 
outlined in Part II, there have been calls for greater individual responsibility in 
banking, both civil and criminal. There is a firming view held by legislators,244 
regulators,245 and judges246 that it is only by obtaining individual sanctions that 
conduct in banking and financial entities will improve. Fisse and Braithwaite 
captured this view 20 years ago when they wrote ‘[t]he impact of enforcement 
can easily stop with a corporate pay-out … because that it is the cheapest and 
most self-protective course’.247  
There are changes in enforcement policy designed to target enforcement 
against individuals, in particular criminal prosecution. Under these policies, 
regulators will only enter settlements with a contravening entity if it hands over 
evidence of participation and potential culpability of executives, including for 
those who are senior and usually difficult to implicate.248 These enforcement 
changes address the difficulties even regulators with legislative power experience 
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in enforcement against individuals. Given, as we have argued, the significant 
obstacles to associational regulation in banking, at least for the foreseeable 
future, it seems one of the limits of professionalism in banking is, and should be, 
in enforcement co-regulation.  
 
D   Professionalism, Standardisation and Online Distribution 
Throughout this article we have argued for a normative dimension to banking 
as part of any professionalisation. That call for normative content through 
professionalising is to address the radical vulnerability of banking clients.249 So 
our final conclusion about how banking might look in the future responds to a 
paradox between the almost ‘utility-like’ necessity for the sale and distribution of 
financial products and services to the general public and the quest for 
professionalism. How can the scale of digital distribution of financial products or 
credit be extended while working to develop and institutionalise professionalism? 
Our arguments in this article advocating for professional structure and practices 
would be for nothing if, through digitisation, banking made an irreversible 
departure from the conditions conducive to professionalising. The vulnerability 
of retail banking customers is especially real, but through online offerings their 
contact with banks is increasingly standardised, online and one of information 
provision, sales and distribution. These observations are also increasingly true of 
the provision of financial advice and stockbroking. Personal financial advisers, 
stockbrokers, investment managers, and trustees are islands of fiduciary 
obligation in a sea of standardisation and commodified distribution to customers. 
The closer these move to online distribution, the greater the danger that they 
become remote from the interpersonal relationship at the heart of professional 
logic.250 
Given the desire for financial inclusiveness and the educative role that good 
advice can play, it is important that the digitisation of banking and finance 
considers not only access, convenience and cost, but also how to preserve 
appropriate advisory and professional elements. We think the response to this 
modern paradox of professionalism lies in ‘designing in’ professional values and 
practices to products, services, and online distribution. Many research and 
program trials are needed to understand what professional online design in 
banking might be, all of which must be left for another time. As the articles in 
this thematic Issue have argued, professionalism is adaptable and the professions 
can change, have changed, and are changing. If, in the online mode, the central 
principles remain responsive to the ‘radical vulnerability’ of the client through 
the duties to the public interest and client priority supported by professional 
association allegiance, there are reasons for optimism about the future of 
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professionalism in banking and in other occupations which aspire to be 
professions.  
 
